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The Negro and Fair Employment
By IRVING KovARsKy*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Civil War ended institutionalized slavery, but the eco-
nomic bondage of the American Negro has persisted since the last
century. This paper will examine the legal and economic road he
has traveled in his search for equal employment opportunity
and the paths which may now open to him.
Slavery became the cornerstone of southern agriculture during
the eighteenth century. Faced with a shortage of white, indentured
servants at a time when expanding markets created an incentive
for increased production, the southern planter reasoned that
African Negroes would be particularly well-suited to withstand
the year-round hard labor under high temperatures required for
the growth of his staple crops.' Furthermore, the purchase of a
slave was a one-time investment. He required no wages, raised his
own subsistence and reproduced himself, insuring a continuous
and inexpensive supply of labor.2
As the financial investment in slavery grew to rival southern
wealth in real property, the planter and his northern creditors
rationalized human ownership on the basis of racial inferiority.
Less than sixty years after the American colonists had fought to
secure their own freedom, De Tocqueville observed:
Whoever has inhabited the United States must have per-
ceived that in those parts of the Union in which the Negroes
are no longer slaves they have in no wise drawn nearer to
the whites. On the contrary, the prejudice of race appears to
be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than
in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so intolerant
*Professor of Business Administration, University of Iowa College of Busi-
ness Administration; LL.M., Yale University; Ph.D., Iowa University.
1 Tobacco, rice, indigo, sugar cane and cotton.
2The few Southerners who spoke against the importation of slaves were
motivated by the fear that the market would be flooded and their human assets
devalued. C. BEAHD, Ecooafc INTERPETAToN OF THE CoNsTrrrTIoN OF THE
UNrrE STATES 176-77 (1961 ed.).
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as in those states where servitude has never been known. 3
The theory of inherent Negro inferiority gained the stamp of
official approval when the Supreme Court announced the in-
famous Dred Scott 4 decision in 1857. Deciding that Negroes could
not claim constitutional protection because they were not citizens,
the Court stated:
They [Negroes] had for more than a century before been
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit
to associate with the white race, either in social or political
relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his bene-
fit.5
Southern belief in the inferiority of the Negro was reinforced
by a fear of bloodshed such as had occurred in Santo Domingo and
Haiti, and the loss of political control if the 4,000,000 slaves were
freed.
Months after the outbreak of the Civil War, President Lincoln
.remained reluctant to end slavery. In fact, he was more interested
in keeping slavery from spreading westward. With the preserva-
tion of the Union his sole aim, he explored the possibilities of
compensating slave-holders for releasing their property, and even
considered shipping Negroes outside the country to establish their
own colonies.6 When political pressures forced the issuance of the
Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, the Negroes' problem of at-
taining equal status in American society was just beginning.
In 1865, the Freedmen's Bureau was created within the War
Department. Its purpose was to implement the Negroes' transi-
tion from slavery to freedom, but the modest budget which the
government provided for its operation was totally inadequate.7
Only five to ten percent of the newly freed Negroes could read or
write." They needed food, shelter and employment which could
not be provided from the wreckage of the southern farm economy.
8 1 A. DE TocQuEvILS DEMoCRAcY iN AnmmucA 373 (1954 ed.) -4 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
5 Id. at 407.
6 G. BENTLEY, A HLswrty or THE Fa miens BmAu 16-18 (1955) [herein-
after cited as BmnrLnY].
7 Id. at 62-63.8 2 B. WASHINcTON, Tim STorY or TnE NEGRo 114 (1940).
[VOL 56,
TsE NEGRO AmND FAm EMLOyMENT
Many were quartered on plantations controlled by the Army,
where they labored under conditions approximating slavery. Al-
though the Bureau operated an employment office and sponsored
a limited form of apprentice training,9 the white man's stamp
upon the Negro as an inferior being could not be erased.10 The
Bureau drew a contract "which would assure the Negro farm
hands of receiving fair treatment, but in the same order .. .
promised the planters that the United States officers would en-
force upon the Negroes all the conditions of continuous and
faithful service, respectful deportment, correct discipline and
perfect subordination. . .. "I'
Sensing a weakness in the federal resolve to aid Negroes, the
southern states passed "Black Code" legislation designed to keep
the Negro in a perpetual state of socio-economic inferiority.12
The failure of the federal Executive, Congress and Judiciary to
respond creatively to the position and problems of the Negro was
partially the result of prevailing political and economic doctrines
of the nineteenth century. Theoretically, an employer seeking to
maximize profits would want the best employees and would have
to pay a fair wage to Negro or white to attract the most efficient
work force. A popular belief existed within the federal Executive
department after the Civil War that employers held little of the
same prejudice toward the Negro which was being expressed by
white laborers competing with them for the same jobs.13 On the
basis of this assumption, there would be no need to break with
laissez faire tradition in order to have employers hire Negroes
on an equal plane with whites. However, this assumption proved
to be a false one as the employer attitude in the South had
been greatly underestimated.
Politically, not only was the doctrine of states' rights in full
flower, but southern representation and power in Congress had
9 Orpbans and destitute children were sent to private homes where skills
could be acquired. P. PEmCE, THE FnEEDMEN'S BuREAu 132-133 (1904).10 This attitude was recognized by Negro leader Booker T. Washington, who
when attempting to secure financial support for Tuskegee University, assured his
white contributors that students would be taught skills, rather than be trained
to think. L. LoaAx, TE NEGRo REVOLT 32-34 (1962).11 BENTLEY 28-24.
12See M. KoNvrrz & T. LEsKEs, A CENTURY or CrviL RicBTs 13 (1961).
13E. MCPHERSON, THE PoLrricAL HisToRy or THE UNrrMED STATES OF
A~mICA DumrIN THE PERIOD OF RECONsTUC'riON 56 (3d. ed. 1880). President
Andrew Johnson held this view.
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been increased by the freeing of the slaves. 14 From 1875' to 1957,
legislative proposals to help the Negro were bitterly fought and
defeated. It is still claimed by some that the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments to the Constitution were successfully
adopted only because southern representatives were prevented
from voting.
The Judiciary was similarly unable to break with the tenets
of states' rights and laissez faire philosophies. In the Civil Rights
Cases,1 the Supreme Court took the position that private dis-
crimination by innkeepers and railroad lines was not equivalent
to the involuntary servitude forbidden by the thirteenth amend-
ment, and that the fourteenth amendment forbad only dis-
crimination by a state. According to the majority of the justices,
the thirteenth amendment was not intended to adjust social in-
equalities between people. Mr. Justice Bradley even admonished
the Negro to find his own place in society and stop being a
"special favorite of the law."'17
The decision in the Civil Rights Cases neutralized Congress.
Given a judiciary which attached greater importance to states'
rights than to individual need, the reasoning of the Court under-
standably preserved the division of authority between state and
federal governments. Further, a claim was made that the decision
was politically motivated-some justices felt that Congress was be-
coming too powerful. By limiting the authority of Congress to
the passage of legislation necessary to counteract state laws, the
Supreme Court tragically inhibited the initiation of any federal
action to prevent corporate and individual discrimination.
Denied relief from the hostility of Confederate attitudes and
desperately seeking gainful employment, the southern Negro
began to move to the industrial centers of the North. From
1875 to 1893, the Negro population of Chicago increased by
10,000, but most found employment only as domestics.' 8 The
14 Prior to the emancipation, only three-fifths of the Negroes in the South
were counted for the purpose of determining representation in Congress. As free
men and citizens, they were fully counted. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
15 The date of the enactment of the second Civil Rights Act which was
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883).
16 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17 id. at 25.
18S. DRAxn & H. CAYToN BLAcK Mmopoous 47 (1945) [hereinafter cited
as DaAKE & CArTON].
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bulk of the Negro population remained in agriculture. In 1890,
of more than 8,000,000 wage earners, nearly 60 per cent were
in agriculture and 80 per cent were in service jobs. The
majority of some 200,000 Negro workers in manufacturing
and mechanical pursuits were unskilled and were for the most
part employed as railroad hands, laborers in lumber and plan-
ning mills, iron and steel plants, and tobacco factories....
In 1890, 90.8 per cent of the total Negro population of 72
million persons resided in the South .... "I
The Negro sensed economic opportunity with the outbreak
of the World War I, and swarmed north to fill the vacancies in
industry created by wartime needs. More than 50,000 Negroes
emigrated to Chicago during the war years.20 Most found un-
skilled or semi-skilled employment in the meat-packing, ship-
building, iron or steel industries. The railroads, vital to the
national war effort, initiated a policy of equal pay for Negro and
white, and lured many Negro employees.2'
Job opportunities decreased with the return of the victorious
army, but the Negro continued to migrate to the northern com-
munities.22 He worked as a truck driver, delivery man or general
laborer in construction, while the white employee continued to
disproportionately dominate the professional, managerial, white
collar and skilled job categories. 23
The period of prosperity from 1920 to 1930 is saturated with
evidence that the Negro would not advance economically without
government intervention. The typical white immigrant could look
forward to economic improvement, but the Negro, generation
after generation, was relegated to jobs less socially and economi-
cally rewarding, and rarely reached the skilled job classification.
Even while acknowledging the skilled qualifications of many
Negroes, employers refused to hire them either because of
personal bias or fear of disrupting plant morale. The tremendous
economic displacement of the Thirties affected the Negro worker
19 1 OFFICE OF [WNAR] PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT, FAr EMPLOYMENT
PRAuaccEs Coini. REP. 85-86 (1943-44) [hereinafter cited as FAr EMPLOYMENT
PRAcnicEs Comm. REP.]20 DRA&m & CAYk-TON 228.
21 M. Ross, ALL MANNER OF MEN 119 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Ross].
22 Between 1920 and 1930, 716,000 left the South for New York, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, Detroit and Chicago. By 1930, sixty percent of the Negro population
lived in cities. 1 FAiR EMPLONMENT PRACnCE Coiras., supra note 19, at 88.
23 C. JOnNSON, PATERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 88-89 (1943).
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more severely than the white. An unemployed white worker,
willing to accept any employment for a regular paycheck, often
"bumped" the Negro laborer from the semi-and-unskilled jobs
traditionally open to him.
The Depression was an ideal time to implement a federal pro-
gram to end discriminatory employment. Confidence in the
laissez faire philosophy was shaken by irrefutable evidence that
continued reduction of prices and wages did not stimulate demand
during a depression.
Following the Keynesian doctrine, with its emphasis on the
stabilization of wages and prices in the short run, federal funds
were pumped into the economy in construction, education,
theatre, etc. Had federal authorities required the equitable use
and training of Negro labor on these projects, progress would
have been made even during the Depression. 24
Although failing to provide an immediate solution to the
problems of Negroes, the new economics spread from the federal
Executive to Congress and the Judiciary. The passage of the
Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act,25 the Wagner Act,26 and
the Fair Labor Standards Act2 7 indicated a changing legislative
policy. Both the Norris-La Guardia and Wagner Acts promoted
the growth of labor unions capable of resisting pay cuts in the
short run, while driving wages gradually upward in the future.
The arrival of World War II brought significant change for
every citizen of our country, including the Negro. Prior to World
War II, the Negro laborer had been exploited and suppressed.
However, increased labor demands of World War II brought the
heretofore second-choice Negro laborer to a position of new
importance. In response to mounting pressures,28 President
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, calling for fair employ-
ment where government contracts were involved.2 9 A Fair Employ-
ment Practices Committee was created under 8802 which held
2 4 Marrow, Preludice and Scientific Method in Labor Relations, 5 IN. & LAB.
EL. REV. 593, 595-6 (1952).25 29 U.S.C. § § 101-15 (1932).
26 29 U.S.C. H§ 151-66 (1935).
2729 U.S.C. § 201 (1938).
28Te threatened march of 50,000 persons was the immediate cause of
Roosevelt's action. See Maslow, FEPC-A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver,
13 U. Cm. L. RBv. 407 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Maslow].
29 3 C.F.R. 957 (Cum. Supp. 1941).
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hearings in the larger cities and uncovered widespread evidence of
discrimination. 30
Because of wide-spread opposition to Executive Order 8802
and the ineffectiveness of the Committee, President Roosevelt
substituted Executive Order 9346, establishing a new Committee
to eliminate discrimination in industries affecting the war effort
and in federal agencies. 31 Discrimination was broadly defined, but
the Committee was without jurisdiction until a complaint was
made. If evidence substantiated the charge, the investigator sought
an amicable solution or requested an interested government
agency to exert economic pressure. When this strategy failed, the
Committee held a public hearing, and through adverse publicity,
tried to force compliance with its demands. Other pressures
exerted were threatening to cancel contracts, forbidding the use
of the offices of the United States Employment Service,32 or lower-
ing the manpower requirements of the employer through the
War Manpower Commission.33
The Fair Employment Practices Committee entertained
charges of discrimination against some of the largest firms in the
United States.34 To appreciate the magnitude of the problem and
to evaluate the effectiveness of the Committee, a review of a few
of their decisions is enlightening. For example, while employers
violated the standards set up by the Committee by instructing
30 Maslow 409-10.
31 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-43 Comp.).
32 During World War II, the federal government controlled the United States
Employment Service; during peacetime, it is state-operated.
33 One author reports some of the difficulties faced by the committee:
The regional offices settled a hundred cases a month. Some of these
were no great shakes. A case was "satisfactorily setted" when an em-
ployer agreed not to discriminate, even though the original complainant
never reappeared to claim the job. Some settlements were the with-
drawal of discriminatory help-wanted advertisements. Som brought
the deserved promotion of only one worker. A qualitative estimate of
such cases is hard to make. At worst, they were merely lip-service and
the avoidance of being involved with a government agency. At best,
trivial cases opened a closed door to others of the minority group,
showed workers of different races and creeds that they could get along
together, and made management more thoughtful on a problem it had
avoided.
Ross 42-43.
3 Firms included were Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., Western Cartridge Co.,
Allis Chalmers Corp., Douglas Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Jones
and Laughlin Steel Co., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., and many others.
1 FAr EMPLOYMENT PnancTEs CoaNm. REP. 79-83 (1943-44).
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plant guards to turn away Negroes applying for employment,35
they did not discriminate by refusing to hire a Jew unwilling to
work on Saturdays6 or by firing Jehovah's Witnesses who refused
to buy war bonds.37
The War Labor Board, created in 1942, controlled wages and
considered labor-management disputes where questions pertaining
to discrimination were raised.38 The Board first faced the problem
of discrimination in 1942 In re Phelps Dodge Corp.s9 where the
employer had refused to include a contractual clause establishing
a non-discriminatory hiring and promotion policy. In spite of the
employer's contention that the provision would lead to plant
disharmony, the Board ordered the clause included in the con-
tract. Nevertheless, the clause approved by the Board left "weasel-
ing" room: "Equal opportunity for employment and advance-
ment.. . as is consistent with efficient and harmonious operation
of the plant."40 (Emphasis added).
In a similar case, the War Labor Board ordered four meat-
packing firms to issue a fair employment statement.41
The employers' request that the union issue a similar statement
was denied because there was no evidence of union discrimination
and because unions normally do not issue such statements. With-
out evidence of discrimination, the Board refused to order an
employer to incorporate a non-discrimination clause into a con-
tract.42
One controversy, similar to the current split of jurisdiction
between the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter re-
ferred to as NLRB] and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission [hereinafter referred to as EEOC] involved the Fair
Employment Practices Committee and the War Labor Board. 43
The War Labor Board ordered a discriminating firm to upgrade
35 Principles Established by the FEPC, 16 L.R.R.M. 2542, 2543 (1945).
36 Id. at 2542.
37Id. at 2543.
3828 W.n LAB. REP'. 12 (1946).
39 1 WAR LAB. REP. 29 (1943).
40 Id. at 34.
41 The firms were Swift & Co., Armour & Co, Wilson & Co.. and Cudahy
& Co. In re Four Packinghouse Cos., 6 WAn LAB. REP. 395 (1943).4 2 Lion's Cooperative Mecantile Institution, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 6 (1944);
Sunken Gardens Restaurant, 20 WAR LAB. REP. 101 (1944). Contra, Century
Projector Co., 20 WAn LAB. REP'. 511 (1945).4 3 Montgomery Ward & Co., 18 WAR LAB. REP. 371 (1945).
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several employees. The employer's argument that the Committee
was delegated exclusive authority to deal with prejudice was re-
jected.44 Inflation and discrimination were questions raised simul-
taneously-equal pay for equal work for Negro and white and
inequality of job opportunity for the Negro.45 In Hercules
Powder Co.,46 Negroes, even though employed only as unskilled
laborers, received lower wages than their white counterparts. The
War Labor Board ordered the firm to raise Negro wages. When
considering a claim of unequal pay, the Board sometimes faced
difficult questions of differentials between jobs.47 Furthermore, a
policy of equal pay for equal work could also lead to increased
discrimination-employers could prefer to hire white employees.48
Although the Negro benefited from the labor shortage4 9
substantial evidence exists that government interference was
necessary to assure Negro employment. In plants under the
jurisdiction of the Fair Employment Practices Committee, total
employment between 1942 and 1944 increased 25 percent while
non-white employment rose by 22.8 percent.50
Wartime experience disclosed a need for extensive and con-
tinuing government intervention.5' The improvement made
during World War II was later partially offset by the increased
number of unskilled Negroes seeking work for the first time.
Between 1940 and 1944, 470,000 Negroes, mostly unskilled, emi-
grated from the South to the North. After the war, many ex-
perienced difficulty in finding employment 52 because in the process
of changing from a wartime to a peacetime economy, unskilled
workmen, irrespective of color, face difficulty. Another damaging
44 For similar cases, see T. B. Wood's Sons Co., 24 WAR LAB. REP. 680
(1945); Southport Petroleum Co., 8 WAR LAB. REP. 714 (1943).
4- 1 U.S. DFP"T. OF LABOR, TBE TERMINATION REP. oF T NAT'L. WAR
LAB. BD. 150 (1946).
465 WA LAB. ERm. 453 (1943).
47 Gibbs Gas Engine Co., 7 WAR LAB. REP. 585 (1943); Southport Petroleum
Co., 8 WAR LAB. REP. 714 (1943); Miami Copper Co., 18 WAR LAB. REP. 591
(1944); Sheet Glass Co., 22 WAR LAB. REP. 340 (1945).
48 In some places, such as racially explosive Chicago, Nero and white,
during World War H, received the same remuneration for the same work.
Dxrm & CAYToN 288-89.
49 G. MmLER, AMRcAN LABOR Am T= Gov ERN 475 (1948).
50 15 L.R.R.M. 2549 (1945).
51 For example, the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co. refused to use Negroes in jobs
with a higher classification. 1 FAr EMPLOYMENT PRACTICEs Col nTrEE REP.
79, 81 (1943).
52 Id. at 93.
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factor was that Negroes were concentrated in wartime industries
which could seldom be converted to profitable peace-time uses.63
The World War II experience heralded an era of executive and
judicial use of power to break economic barriers. Wartime ex-
perience proved that executive intervention could be effectively
used and established the need for direct and forceful anti-dis-
crimination legislation. Although a lack of direction was en-
countered when President Roosevelt, bowing to the influence of
some members of Congress, did not support the Committee when
it sought to act more effectively, 54 New York and other states pro-
fited by the wartime experience of the federal Committee and
passed Fair Employment Practices [hereinafter cited as FEP]
legislation adopting the administrative technique of the federal
agencies.
Although World War II brought positive change for Negro
employment outlook, the years following that conflict have not
brought the total equality which he continues to seek. Beginning
with World II, federal and state agencies recognized the unique
problems of the Negro and initiated programs to eliminate dis-
crimination. However, the rate of Negro unemployment is still
excessive. It seems plausible that, had it not been for government
intervention, Negro unemployment would have been greater.
Some, however, claim that government intervention has been
detrimental to the Negro.55
Several factors not present in the Forties are now contributing
to Negro unemployment. A major one is technological displace-
ment. Unskilled laborers are the principal victims of mechaniza-
tion. The Negro who works at this level, and the majority do,
merely marks time until he is replaced by a new mechanical
innovation. Today, unskilled, unemployed Negroes face per-
manent unemployment.
The enactment of minimum wage laws has also affected Negro
employment. The Fair Labor Standards Act has been both
53 [1945] FAIR EmPLOymiENT PAcrcEs Col airrEa FiNAL REP. 41.
54 Maslow, The Law and Race Relations, 244 ANNALS, 75, 78 (1956).
55 There are some instances which support this claim. In the southern paper
industry, for example, 30 percent of the work force in 1939 was Negro; by 1951,
an interval of time during which overall employment rose by 93 percent, Negro
employment dropped by 19 percent. The decreased use of Negro labor was at-
tributed to mechanization and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Employers seemed
to favor the more e....cient white employee. NAT'L PLANNING ASSN CoLmi. oF
THE SouTrr 237-38 (1953).
[Vol. 56,
THE NEGRO AND Fra EMNLOYMENT
beneficial and detrimental to the Negro. By attacking the short
run problem of current minimum wage, the Act results in the
displacement of some marginal workers, while raising the income
of those who "survive" the wage increase. Increasing compen-
sation alone for unskilled workers, however, is treating merely
the symptom and not the disease. Instead, the Negro, while
working for a minimum wage, needs long run help in the form
of job training so that he can move to jobs requiring more skill.
The increased utilization of female labor has also affected the
employment opportunities of the Negro. Because the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 forbids discrimination based on sex, 6 one can antici-
pate that more of the desirable jobs will be secured by women in
the future. Although Negro females are for the most part restrict-
ed to either professional positions, mainly teaching, or the lowest
paying jobs,5 7 they often compete with male Negroes for the
available jobs.
Both union and management, in addition to government, have
important roles to play in eliminating discrimination in employ-
ment; yet, thus far neither has fully accepted its responsibility.
Although unions have always emphasized their desire to attain
equal employment opportunities and although union leaders have
generally attempted to eliminate discrimination, unions continue
to engage in the practice. Industry, on the other hand, while
making extensive and noteworthy contributions to society, has
shown little tendency to deal with moral questions. Industrial
management can curtail discrimination in industry only if it
accepts the responsibility to do so and exerts the appropriate effort.
Recent studies have shown that with positive management plan-
ning, equal employment opportunity can be achieved.58
An attempt will now be made to evaluate legislation, judicial
decisions and private actions leaning upon the Negroes' quest for
fair employment.
II. FAiR EMPLOYMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The Negro has felt that the white community is hostile to any
5642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
57 E. GNZBErG, THE NEGRO PoTmmiAL 27-29 (1956).
5B P. NORGIEN, et al., EmPLOxmNG Naiwo N AmnmCAN INDUSTmY 35
(1959).
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policy which promotes his social and economic equalization.Y
Negro respect for government early became stifled as a result of
the Dred Scott decision,6 0 which officially stamped the Negro as
inferior to the white, and the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments, which accomplished little for the
Negro attempting to acclimate to a white-dominated world.
Further, Plessy v. Ferguson,61 which separated Negro from white
in the classroom, stamped a mark of inferiority on the Negro.
Once the pattern of discrimination rationalization was established,
the Negro for many years seemed resigned to its continuance. But
government policy can change; the executive and judicial
branches of government have paved the way for change. Today,
many government officials are concerned with justice for the
Negro. 2
The Supreme Court decision in the Civil Rights Cases63 was
a strict interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, which, al-
though forbidding government discrimination, seemingly con-
doned industry discrimination. Having little economic power, the
greatest equalizer, the Negro was placed at a disadvantage by this
narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. Few govern-
ment jobs were available at the time of the decision, and the
Negro, looking to agriculture or industry for employment, could
not expect government intervention. This lack of aid became
even more damaging as the Negro moved from southern agri-
culture to northern industry.
It is unfortunate that the majority on the Supreme Court did
not adopt the dissenting viewpoint of Justice Harlan in the Civil
Rights Cases. Justice Harlan accepted the majority thesis that
discriminatory state action was essential before the Negro was
entitled to the protection of the fourteenth amendment, but he
adopted the avant garde position that hotels and railroads, as
businesses operating under special state rules and license, fell
within the discrimination prohibition of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The value of the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan
59 See R. ELasoN, THE IuvismLE MAx (1952); R. Wmoirr, BLACn Boy
(1945); R. Wmicr, BLAcK PowER (1945).
60 See note 4, supra.
61163 U.S. 537 (1896).62 Blumrosen, Antidiscrimination Laws in Action in New Jersey: A Law-
Sociology Study, 19 RuTrGEs L. REv. 189 (1965).
63 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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was not realized until after World War I. Following the decision
in Shelley v. Kraemer,4 the Supreme Court gradually began to
expand the types of discriminatory state action prohibited by the
fourteenth amendment. Was state financial aid sufficient reason
to invoke the fourteenth amendment where private industry dis-
criminates? What if tax exemptions are granted to a firm which
discriminates? Is greater responsibility imposed on the state when
discrimination occurs on state rather than on private property?
A limiting aspect of the fourteenth amendment was its nega-
tive, rather than positive, support. The fourteenth amendment
could not support federal legislation to promote equality; it
could only be used to end unlawful state activity.65 In fact, Con-
gress utilized the power of the Civil War amendments only after
southern states enacted the Black Codes.
Although, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court held
that the thirteenth amendment authorized Congress to pass
positive legislation without state discrimination, this did not help
the Negro seeking a job.68 If the thirteenth amendment had been
broadly interpreted to minimize private wrongs which were some-
what related to prior conditions of slavery, it would have been
meaningful. Since the Negro had already been freed formally
by executive proclamation and practically by the Civil War, the
Judiciary could have viewed the thirteenth amendment as more
than a congressional attempt to abolish slavery. However, since
the emphasis on the amendment, as reflected in legislative history
and early judicial interpretation, was on the abolishment of the
institutions of slavery, courts have been hesitant to interpret it
more liberally.
Even if the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments had been
construed to prohibit discrimination by private industry, it is un-
likely that the first generation of freed Negroes would have been
materially and immediately benefited. The Negro released from
slavery first needed basic assistance-basic education, industrial
6434 U.S. 1 (1948).
65 See, e.g., Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Corrigan v. Buckley,
271 U.S. 323 (1927); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Baldwin v.
Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S.(16 Wall.) 36 (1872).66 Ten Broek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution cf the United
States, 39 CMAF. L. EEv. 171 (1951).
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training, housing, and, in some instances, transportation from
southern agriculture to northern industry. Yet, the long run
benefit of interpreting the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments to prohibit private discrimination would have been sub-
stantial.
The decision in Plessy v. Ferguson endorsed segregation at a
time when the white southerner could have been forced to accept
the Negro. After the crushing defeat of the Civil War, white
citizens in the South would have followed northern leadership
forcing the economic and educational integration of the Negro.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court and political leaders failed to
provide the necessary leadership and direction. Plessy, by tol-
erating segregation, implies that neither the North nor the South
was willing to accept the Negro as an equal and, as a consequence,
white dominance was accepted as a way of life.
Two other themes are inherent in the nineteenth century
Supreme Court decisions inolving the Negro. The first is that
of states' rights. The Supreme Court, concerned with the growing
centralization of power, was unwilling to propose a construction
of the fourteenth amendment which would have increased the
federal sphere of influence. Certainly the Supreme Court was
aware of blatant state discrimination. Evidently, the Supreme
Court was more willing to tolerate discrimination against the
Negro than endorse a doctrine of increased federal authority.
A second theme in the Civil Rights Cases was the laissez faire
economic attitudes of the Supreme Court. Prior to the 1930 De-
pression, its public acceptance was extensive and denying the ap-
plication of the fourteenth amendment to private industry, the
Supreme Court adopted a laissez faire policy. While Congress was
constitutionally empowered to regulate commerce, 67 there was a
judicial unwillingness to regulate employment malpractice as a
necessary corollary to regulating goods moving in the stream of
commerce. Instead, the Supreme Court felt that employment was
local, rather than interstate in character. Thus, in spite of
evidence of industrial monopoly, and in spite of positive evidence
of industrial handicaps imposed on the Negro, the Supreme Court
followed laissez faire in the Civil Rights Cases.
Although discrimination in employment was not a considera-
67See, e.g., Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1934).
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tion, the Supreme Court, in deciding Shelley v. KraemerP
ushered in a new era of hope for the Negro in industry. Because
of a change in personnel as well as in social and economic condi-
tions, the Supreme Court, cognizant of precedent and yet un-
willing to follow doctrine laid down in the Civil Rights Cases,
adopted, with modifications, the dissenting view of Harlan in the
Civil Rights Cases. The Court held in Shelley that a restrictive
covenant does not violate the fourteenth amendment, but if
judicial enforcement becomes necessary, there is state action
intolerable under the fourteenth amendment.6 9
The legal changes leading to the rule laid down in Shelley
evolved slowly. The Supreme Court in 1879 felt that the four-
teenth amendment forbad discrimination by all branches of
government, including the Judiciary.70 Subsequently, a few cases
reached the Supreme Court where judicial discrimination clearly
violated the fourteenth amendment.71 But in these cases, direct
court discrimination is discernible; in Shelley, private parties
entered into a discriminatory covenant in which the state played
no part.
Shelley represents, at the very least, a partial retreat from the
Supreme Court position in the Civil Rights Cases. Prior to
Shelley, the courts accepted both the validity of a racially re-
strictive covenant and the validity of its enforcement.72 Any at-
tempt to distinguish the Civil Rights Cases and Shelley on the
basis of state enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant does
not seem fruitful. But if it is recognized, first, that constitutional
and legislative changes are difficult to accomplish, second, that
the Supreme Court was dissatisfied with the segregationist view of
the Civil Rights Cases, and, third, the limiting language of the
fourteenth amendment, then the Supreme Court decision in
Shelley can be regarded as a break with the past. To hold that
08334 U.S. 1 (1948).
69 Id. at 13-14.
7 0 Virg"n"a v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). See also Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908): Carter v. Texas, .177 U.S. 442 (1900); Chicago, B.&O. R.R.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
71 A judge engages in state action when excluding Negroes from jury duty,
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), and by wrongfully holding a Negro re-
porter in contempt of Court, Craig v. Henry, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).72 Corrigan v. Buckley, 27 U.S. 323, 330 (1926); Los Angeles Investment
Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 P. 596 (1920); Queensborough Land Co. v.
Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
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an agreement is legal but not entitled to court enforcement is a
most novel approach. Usually, adoption of a legal agreement re-
sults in judicial enforcement of the contract. Perhaps the Supreme
Court in Shelley took its cue from congressional passage of the
Norris-La Guardia Act which did not outlaw the yellow dog con-
tract, but made such contracts unenforceable. 3
With the passing years, personal liberty was considered of
greater significance by the Supreme Court than business interests,
but the lack of personal freedom and economic want cannot be
separated. When Shelley was decided by the Supreme Court, a
decision, supporting a constitutional ideology which places the
individual above business interests, the Negro was already being
given an economic lift by the executive branch of government,
although the assistance was limited and in need of more ex-
pedient implementation. The right to earn a living has to be
judicially protected if for no other reason than that the total
federal government is committed to Keynesian economics.7 4 But
even the partial relief extended in Shelley was sharply debated on
constitutional grounds.7 5 Shelley opened the door to a never-end-
ing consideration of the meaning of state action.
In Barrows v. Jackson,76 the defendants, ignoring the racially
restrictive terms of a contract, permitted Negro use of real pro-
perty. Attempting to avoid Shelley, the plaintiffs in Barrows sued
for damages rather than specific enforcement. The majority in
Barrows said that attempting to distinguish Shelley on the basis
of damages versus injunctive relief was without merit. Thus, the
fourteenth amendment was held to prohibit a court award of
damages for breaking a racially restrictive agreement.
It is interesting to compare Barrows and Shelley with the
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Rice v. Sioux City Memo-
rial Park Cemetery.77 In Rice, the operator of a private cemetery
7329 U.S.C. § 101 (1932).74 The right to earn a living may be constitutionally guaranteed today.
See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) and Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S.
678, 684 (1888). If the right to earn a living is constitutionally guaranteed, and
this seems plausible when equating employment with a property right, the
approach taken in the Civil Rights Cases is outmoded.
75 Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 473 (1962); Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor
Unions, 50 GEO. L.J. 457 (1962); Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor
Union, and "Governmental Actions." 70 YALE L. J. 345 (1961).
76 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
77349 U.S. 70 (1955).
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refused to bury a decorated combat veteran of World War II, a
Winnebago Indian, because interment was restricted to the Cau-
casian race. The Supreme Court, in denying the widow's request
for damages for mental suffering, refused to expand Shelley and
Barrows or reverse the Civil Rights Cases. Sihce private persons,
without judicial enforcement, discriminated, the widow in Rice
was denied damages. Conceptually, the state owed no affirmative
duty to alleviate private discrimination. The failure to overrule
the Civil Rights Cases must have left the Supreme Court liberals
disturbed.
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,78 a city rented
space to a restaurateur who refused to serve Negro patrons. The
lease, negotiated between the city and the restaurateur, neither
forbad nor compelled discrimination. The Supreme Court found
a violation of the fourteenth amendment because: 1) The
land and facilities were publicly owned and dedicated to
public use. 2) The store space provided was an integral rather
than an inconsequential part of the total facilities. 3) The state
is obliged to protect all citizens irrespective of color on publicly
owned property. Thus, a failure to protect the Negro is the same
as overt discrimination. "By its inaction . . . the State has not
only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected
to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination." 79 In a nutshell, the Court held state inaction to
be the same as state action on state property. In Rice, the dis-
crimination took place on private property whereas public pro-
perty was featured in Burton. But in the Civil Rights Cases, the
railroads and hotels operated somewhere between public and
private ownership. Railroads in particular carry a quasi-public
stamp because of regulation by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and early financing by the donation of public land.
Shelley, contrary to Burton, involved discrimination on private
property until the court, a public institution, was asked to enforce
the racially restrictive agreement.
Other decisions involving the fourteenth amendment are of
interest. In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, o a library once
78 365 U.S. 715 (1961). State inaction was not tolerated under the fifteenth
amendment. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).79 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).80 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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privately endowed but currently the recipient of considerable
public support, refused to admit Negroes. Because of extensive
public aid, there was enough state involvement to violate the
fourteenth amendment. Yet, a private corporation financing a
large housing project could constitutionally exclude Negro ten-
ants,81 and a private art school was permitted to ban Negro stu-
dents, 8 2 even though benefiting from a tax exemption and limited
financial aid from the public. In light of the nature of the aid, it
seems strange that judicial enforcement of a discriminatory agree-
ment in Shelley and Barrows is considered sufficient state in-
volvement to be prohibited by the fourteenth amendment, espe-
cially when one considers direct financial aid to private groups
practicing discrimination is not sufficient state action.
In Marsh v. Alabama,s3 a decision made two years before
Shelley, the Supreme Court had found state involvement where a
private corporation owned and dominated the entire town. In a
similar and more recent situation, a Mississippi sheriff transported
three civil rights workers from jail to a lonely area where private
citizens murdered them.8 4 The Supreme Court, finding state in-
volvement because of the conspiracy between the sheriff and
private citizens, said:
Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the
prohibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes
of the statute. To act 'under color' of law does not require
that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that
he is a willful participant in point of activity with the State or
its agents.
* * * *
State officers participated in every phase of the alleged ven-
ture: the release from jail, the interception, assault and
murder. It was a joint activity, from start to finish.85
In Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell,86 a contractor
bought land to build a subdivision near Chicago. The contractor,
anticipating an integrated neighborhood, adopted a quota system
81 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d. 541 (1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).82 Norris v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md.
1948).83 826 U.S. 501 (1946).
s4 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
851d. at 794-95.
86286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
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to maintain a fixed ratio of Negro to white. To avoid an all
white or all Negro residential section, the builder reserved the
right to maintain the quota by controlling resales. It should be
noted that the builder, rather than discriminating, was attempting
to maintain integration. The lower court, without fully con-
sidering the purpose behind the quota system, followed what is
tantamount to a per se rule that all quotas are unconstitutional.
The appellate court, relying on Shelley, found the agreement
establishing a quota system valid; only when the court is asked to
enforce the agreement would there be state action violating the
fourteenth amendment. For all practical purposes, the appellate
court decision would have the effect of supporting segregation.
In the final analysis, there can be no discrimination on state
property, either by state action or inaction. On private property,
the fourteenth amendment forbids only affirmative, discriminatory
acts by the state. Although it would seem more expedient and
logical to condemn state inaction where there is some form of
public support, such is the circuitous course of law when shifting
conditions and policies call for a change which Congress is re-
luctant to undertake. It is probable that the Supreme Court would
have impliedly or expressly reversed its position in the Civil
Rights Cases had Congress failed to enact legislation to curb dis-
crimination in employment. Such a decision was made unnecessary
when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.87
III. UNIONS AND DISCRIMInNATION
After the Civil War, a lack of federal concern led to the total
exclusion of Negroes from Southern unions. 8 Entrance restric-
tions were also found in the more numerous Northern unions. In
some, only relatives of members could join a union; a lily-white
union automatically excluded Negroes.89
Although the National Labor Union and Knights of Labor,
87 For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see text following note
280, infra.88 Marshall, Unions and the Negro Community, 17 IND. & LAB. REL. REv.
179 (1964). In New Orleans, Negroes could work as stevedores only if eligible
to vote. C. JOEMSON, PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 88-89 (1943). Since
the Southern Negro was disenfranchised, in spite of the fifteenth amendment, the
Negro in New Orleans seldom found employment in New Orleans.89 Lefkowitz v. Farrell, 3 CCH 1964 LAB. L. REP. U1 4996.81 (N.Y. State
Commission for Human Rights 1964).
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industrial unions organizing in the North and South, accepted
Negro members,90 by the beginning of the twentieth century the
increasingly powerful northern craft unions excluded the Negro
from almost every skilled trade. Negro labor was occasionally used
to break strikes, but union leaders in the North, cognizant of the
need to develop bargaining strength and the need to restrict
competition from unorganized labor, felt that Negroes would pose
less of a threat if confined to segregated locals. Furthermore, some
Negroes preferred the segregated local as a means of barring from
membership immigrants from the South.91
From the nineteenth century until the 1930 Depression,
unions, on the whole, were virtually impotent. The Wagner Act52
ushered in an era favorable to overall union growth by curbing
employer hostility while promoting collective bargaining. Be-
cause of the rise of younger, more liberal leaders in the CIO, and
because of the need to enlist the support of employees holding
less desirable positions, white organizers wooed Negroes in the
steel, rubber, automobile, and other industries.93 To capture Negro
confidence, the CIO employed Negro organizers and union
officials. Thus one consequence of the Wagner Act was the
increase in the number of Negroes in the unions.
It would be false to conclude that all unions affiliated with the
CIO were free of discrimination. Prejudice was commonplace
even within the CIO as few Negroes held better paying jobs. Dis-
crimination occurred when collective bargaining contracts were
negotiated with seniority determining retention and promotion.
Furthermore, even the most liberal CIO leaders did not under-
take to promote Negroes, a factor which later led to Negro dis-
satisfaction. Some CIO members resented the Negro, a condition
partially attributable to the past employment of Negro strike-
breakers.14 Irrespective of union will, employers and their
supervisors refused to promote the Negro. During this time
when unions were primarily concerned with gaining a toe-
90 C. JOiHSON, PATrEnNS op NEGRO SEGIREGATION 94 (1943).91 Marsha l, supra note 88, at 179-180.
9229 U.S.C. §§ 51-53 (1935).
93 DRA E & CAYrON 312-14. For example, Walter Reuther of the U.A.W.,
an influential and liberal labor leader, needed Negro support to organize the
union at Ford Motor Company. Marshall, supra note 88 at 181-85.94 DnAx & CAYToN 321.
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hold and matching the power of the large employer, the needs of
the Negro could not be given priority.
Although Gompers and Strasser may not have been inclined
toward prejudice, the AFL was born at a time when employer
and government hostility toward unions understandably pushed
Negro welfare into the background. Until recently, most unions
did not frown upon racial hostility and AFL leaders, like business
leaders, found it easier to move with the crowd. When founded
in 1886, the AFL adopted a policy of racial equality which, un-
fortunately, was never implemented.95 After the invocation of the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments failed to help
the Negro, and after the Supreme Court decisions in PlessY v.
Ferguson and the Civil Rights Cases confirmed public apathy,
leaders of the AFL knew that neither public authorities nor
private industry would protest union discrimination. The ap-
proach adopted was similar to that of the CIO: where the Negro
was considered essential to AFL unions, segregated locals were
established.
The manner in which the AFL unions federated also injured
the Negro. Amalgamated on the principle of autonomy, each
national and international union could withdraw without fear of
reprisal. Thus the federation never effectively controlled its af-
filiates or checked wrongdoing within their ranks. Federation
policy meant little where individual unions preferred to discri-
minate, and any pressure on a union disagreeing with federation
policy usually resulted only in withdrawal of that union.
At one time, more than one-half of all skilled Negro laborers
were employed in the building trades.96 In fact, building trade
unions in the South were dominated by the Negro. However, since
industrial employment opportunity was limited in the South,
white workmen entered the building trades and gradually
squeezed the Negro out of the skilled jobs and into common
labor. The northern Negro was always excluded from jobs re-
quiring skill, even in the construction industry-the Plumbers,
Carpenters, Electricians, and Steamfitters unions have a long
history of Negro exclusion.
The passage of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 9T protecting
95 H. NoRTmup, ORGANIZA'TON LABOR AND THE NEGRO 5-6,8 (1944).
96 Id. at 17.
97 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1926).
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union organization and promoting collective bargaining together
with the Wagner Act of 1936,98 eliminating employer inter-
9829 U.S.C. §§ 51-53 (1936).
ferences with the autonomous organization of employees into
unions, indicates an early federal policy favoring union growth
and appropriate public intervention to achieve this goal. In light
of this government policy encouraging a strong union, it is difficult
to explain government neutrality toward union discrimination.
Once the government assumed responsibility for union develop-
ment, liberating the Negro from union discrimination should
have been but a minor implementing step.
During the early years of the 1930 Depression, union survival
was of paramount importance. But after passage of the Wagner
Act and the emergence of prosperity ushered in by World War
II, some of the more liberal and thoughtful union leaders began
to exhibit interest in the well-being of the Negro. Even before
the merger of the AFL and CIO, several union leaders examined
strategies to undercut the effects of racial discrimination. 9 After
the merger, racial equality was listed as a top priority, although
the leadership seemed unable to effectively enforce it.
The establishment of state Fair Employment Practices Com-
missions [hereinafter referred to as FEPC's], various federal court
and National Relations Labor Board [hereinafter referred to as
NLRB] decisions, in addition to federal intervention have com-
bined to officially end union discrimination in railroad brother-
hoods although little actual change in union leadership took
place. In the past decade, national union leaders have supported
fair employment legislation, recognizing that little would be
accomplished internally without government intervention.
IV. RAiLWAY I,oR ACr
Under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 00 cases in-
volving racial discrimination and fair representation were tried in
99 Marshall, supra note 88, at 184. In 1930 more than twenty-two national
unions barred Negroes from membership by constitutional stipulation; in 1943 the
number dropped to thirteen. By 1960 only three national unions, railroad
brotherhoods, unafliated with the AFL-CIO, formally barred Negroes. P.
NonG EEN & S. HILL, TowAED FArm E mLOyMENT 41 (1964).
10045 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1926).
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the courts rather than before administrative agencies. With the
decision in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R.101 during World War II,
the belief arose that fair representation by unions would pro-
hibit racial discrimination. The plaintiff in that case, a Negro, was
hired in 1910 as a fireman in a district where ninety-eight percent
of the firemen were Negroes. 10 2 In Steele, the employer and union
negotiated an agreement requiring that fifty percent of the firemen
be Negro and white labor be hired exclusively until this ratio
was reached. Reversing the Alabama Supreme Court, which
found nothing in the Railway Labor Act prohibiting discrimina-
tion, the Supreme Court reasoned that an exclusive bargaining
agent, promoted and protected by federal law, must represent all
members fairly. A union could not, according to the Supreme
Court, negotiate a contract which racially discriminated against
its members. The Court decision was prompted by the change in
attitude of the executive branch of government toward the Negro
and an unwillingness to test the concept of government action
under the fifth amendment. Thus, the individual Negro was en-
titled to protection from discrimination by employers and union.
In two related cases, the Supreme Court continued to expand
its role in dealing with employer-union agreements to discrimate
in violation of the Railway Labor Act. In Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Howard,10 3 the Court further extended the rationale
of Steele and considered the interplay between administrative
and court regulation. In Steele, the Negro complainant was
theoretically represented by the defendant union; however, in
Howard, the Negro complainants were members of another
union. As in Steele, the union in the Howard case had limited, by
contract, the number of jobs available to Negroes. Without
showing why an administrative remedy was unavailable, Mr.
Justice Black, presenting the majority opinion, concluded that,
"Bargaining agents who enjoy the advantages of the Railway
Labor Act's provisions must execute their trust without lawless
invasions of the rights of other workers.."14 In Tunstall v.
1oi23 U.S. 192 (1954).
102 Railroads were then unorganized and Negroes found employment as
firemen because they were willing to work for less in a position which was un-
attractive to other persons.103 43 U.S. 768 (1952).
104 Id. at 774.
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Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,1 5 the employees claiming
discrimination were not affiliated with any union; yet it was de-
cided that this did not prevent judicial intervention and that
initial administrative proceedings were not required. These three
cases reveal that the Supreme Court finally recognized that
unions in the railroad industry held a "life and death" grip on
workmen which only a judicial decision could break.
Where the Negro is concerned, union representation in the
railroad industry has resulted in a smaller share of economic
benefits; even if represented by a segregated local, the bargain-
ing power and control of the dominant white brotherhood spells
loss for the Negro. In addition, federal courts do not have
jurisdiction to review the certification of unions made by the
National Mediation Board which has been unconcerned with
Negro welfare.106 If the National Mediation Board would halt
discrimination at its starting point, representation, court inter-
vention would be less frequent. But, since the Board is unwilling
or unable to check union abuse of authority, the Judiciary will
continue to intercede on behalf of the Negro.
Turning to the point of court protection for the Negro, the
decisions in Steele, Howard and Tunstall leave a great deal to be
desired.107 First, employer discrimination is not prohibited unless
there is union involvement. Further, the best method of checking
discrimination is by refusing certification or decertifying unions
at the administrative level. Considering democratic safeguards, it
is perhaps unfortunate that courts do not review certifications
made by the National Mediation Board. The "wholesale" aspects
of discrimination could be minimized if certification and de-
certification were used vigorously to protect the Negro. Where a
case-by-case remedy is the only approach, discrimination on a
large scale continues unabated. In addition, a judicial proceeding
is costly, time-consuming, and ill-suited to cope with the breadth
of the problem.108 Even if adequately protected in court, the
105 323 U.S. 210 (1944). For cases following this view, see Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen v. Mitchell, 190 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1951); Rolax v. Atlantic
C.L.R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
106 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204-06 (1944).
1 D7 For a more realistic approach, see Betts v. Easley 161 Kan. 457, 169
P.2d 831 (1946), where the court held that economic discrimination against
employees was constitutionally forbidden.
108 Since the Supreme Court decision in Steele, Negroes in the railroad
(Continued on next page)
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Negro can rarely afford to assume costs.
The Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson'0 9 extended further
the doctrine enunciated in Steele. An employer eliminated forty-
five jobs held by Negroes and then hired white employees to per-
form the identical functions under a different title. When the
union refused to invoke the use of the contractually established
grievance procedure in behalf of a Negro member, judicial as-
sistance was sought. Invoking a jurisdictional defense, the de-
fendant claimed that the dispute should have been dealt with
by the Railway Adjustment Board. However, Mr. Justice Black,
writing the majority opinion, said:
The Railroad Labor Act, in an attempt to aid collective
action by employees, conferred great power and protection
on the bargaining agent.... As individuals or small groups
the employees cannot begin to possess the bargaining power
of their representative .... We do not pass on the Union's
claim that it was not obliged to handle any grievances at all
because we are clear that once it undertook to bargain or pre-
sent grievances for some of the employees it represented
it could not refuse to take similar action in good faith for
other employees just because they were Negroes.110
If the dispute is between employer and union, boards in the
railroad industry would have jurisdiction. In Conley, the problem
was between the union and its members, not the employer.1 1
Thus, judicial intervention was essential because the Railway
Labor Act does not provide an arena to deal with disputes be-
tween members and their union. Even if the Railway Labor Act
had provided for administrative relief, problems of fairness would
necessarily have been encountered. The National Mediation
Board certifies union representatives knowing that segregated
locals result in inferior treatment for the Negro. If a certified
union segregates or excludes Negroes, the selection of the bar-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
industry have sued for $6,000,000 in real and punitive damages and have col-
lected only a paltry $5,802. Herring, The -Fair Representation Doctrine": An
Effective Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination, 24 MD. L. REv. 113,
144-45 (1964).
109 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Oid. at 47.
111 The district court in Conley v. Gibson, 138 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Tex.
1955), refused to pass on the question of whether segregated locals constituted
a per se violation. See also Davis v. Local 783, Ry. Carmen, 272 S.W.2d 147
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
1968]
KENTUcKY LAw JoNAL[L
gaining representative and subsequent union policy is left to
white employees. Under such circumstances, how could the
National Mediation Board conduct a fair election? Further, the
National Railway Adjustment Board, a partisan group repre-
senting employers and unions, administers collective bargaining
agreements.1 2 The Board is not a neutral agency, and its decisions
are not judicial in character. In addition, the Board holds that the
union, and not the member, controls the processing of griev-
ances 118
Under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, railway unions which segre-
gate or exclude Negroes commit a violation per se. The National
Mediation Board should take notice of the recent federal law
and should withhold certification or should undertake decertifica-
tion if the brotherhoods continue to employ a caste system.
Other decisions have been made concerning administrative
versus court jurisdiction, and even more are imminent. In Smith
v. Evening News," 4 the Supreme Court decided that under
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,"15 a suit can be brought in a
court circumventing the NLRB and the unfair labor practice
provisions where the subject matter of the dispute is covered by
a collective bargaining contract. Thus, exclusive administrative
regulation is not favored where a contractual relationship exists.
With respect to questions arising under the Railway Labor Act,
the Supreme Court, ignoring administrative regulation, has also
shown an inclination to intervene even where there is discrimina-
tion. Where there is racial discrimination, the NLRB has shown
greater appreciation of the problems than either of the two
agencies regulating the railroad industry. If the NLRB is bypassed
in favor of court regulation because a contract exists, then the
Supreme Court, heavily committed to equality, will bypass ad-
ministrative regulation in the railroad industry. The Court, com-
mitted to racial equality, cannot tolerate the lackadaisical ap-
proach of the National Mediation Board and the Railway Ad-
justment Board.
Distinctions made in considering the propriety of judicial
11245 U.S.C. § 153 (1952).
113 Railway Labor Act-Representation of Racial Minority Groups in Bargain-
ing and Contract Administration Without Discrimination, 36 N.C.L. BREv. 529,
532 (1958).
114371 U.S. 195 (1962). The case did not involve racial discrimination.
115 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947).
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intervention rather than administrative action are rather vague
and illusory. As a result, deciding when a court should properly
exercise initial jurisdiction in questions involving racial dis-
crimination is difficult. If an employer abolishes jobs held by
Negroes which are no longer economically justifiable,116 or if white
employees protected by a white-dominated union are disputing
with an employer, courts favor deferring to an administrative
body. But where a collective bargaining agreement calls for dis-
crimination," 7 or where a union discriminates against a Negro
without the formality of a contract,"18 direct judicial relief has
been granted, partially because an adequate administrative remedy
is unavailable. Yet, a court may require administrative interven-
tion even when discrimination is apparent.119 But suppose there
is both jurisdictional rivalry and discrimination-is administra-
tive intervention required before judicial relief is authorized?20
This question is still unanswered.
V. TmE TAr-HARTLEY Acr
Prior to the Wagner Act of 1935,121 unions, generally lacking
economic and political power, operated without public support.
As a result, organized labor consistently fought an uphill battle
for survival. The Wagner Act unquestionably triggered in-
creased union growth and this legislative approval of unions was
followed by favorable judicial interpretation. Unions today are
important politically and are respected by the executive branch
of government. Negroes since World War II have also found
favor in executive circles. Unfortunately, the support of unions
sometimes conflicts with the policy of fair employment since some
unions exclude or segregate the Negro.
16 Howard v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 61 L.R.R.M. 2036 (D. Md. 1965).
But see Wood v. Randolph, 164 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1954).
17 Williams v. Central of Ga. Ry., 124 F. Supp. 164 (D. Ga. 1954);
Chapman v. Local 104, Machinists Union, 199 F. Supp. 186 (D. W. Va. 1961);Peflicer v. Brotherhood of By. & Steamship Clerks, 217 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 912 (1955).
'I8 Dillard v. Cincinnati & O.R.R., 199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952); Richardson
v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957).
119 Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1948); Davis v. Brother-
hood of Ry. Carmen, 272 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).120 Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 840 (1953).12129 U.S.C. §§ 51-53 (1936).
KENTucKy LAw jouNAL[Tl
The NLRB and Supreme Court, in dealing witl the Taft-
Hartley Act,122 have gradually followed the earlier interpretations
of the Railway Labor Act and demand that fair representation be
given the Negro. In 1952, one court of appeals decision indicated
that the Taft-Hartley Act does not require fair representation.'
Since the union involved was not certified by the NLRB, the
court could find nothing applicable in the Taft-Hartley Act to
assure fair representation for the Negro. In the same year, how-
ever, the Supreme Court decided that a certified union must
fairly represent all employees, although color discrimination was
not a problem in that case.124
Finally, in Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers,2 5 the Supreme
Court in a per curiam decision held that a union discriminating
against Negroes does engage in unfair representation which is pro-
hibited by law. The Supreme Court decision in Syres was techni-
cally far-reaching since every union certified by the NLRB was
required to bargain fairly for all employees in the bargaining unit.
Reversing the court of appeals,126 the Supreme Court found the
Steele, Howard, and Tunstall decisions interpreting the Rail-
way Act, 27 to be applicable.- Since it encompasses these cases,
Syres is broad enough to protect Negroes in integrated unions,
non-union employees, and those belonging to other unions. Thus,
the case-by-case protection of the Negro under the Railway Labor
Act was extended in one blow to the Taft-Hartley Act. In 1964,
the Supreme Court confirmed and somewhat added to the posi-
tion taken in Syres.128 Not only must the collective agreement
contain no discriminatory provisions but a contract, fair on its
face, must be fairly administered by the union and the employer.
Syres was an important decision theoretically because, by
endorsing the use of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Supreme Court
took a step toward preventing unions from clinging to discrim-
inatory practices. Partially because of the absence of federal
legislation forbidding discrimination in employment, the Supreme
12229 U.S.C. H 141-168 (1947).
123Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 840 (1953).
124 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffiman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-88 (1953).
125350 U.S. 892 (1955).
126 Syres v. Local 28, Oil Workers, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
127 See notes 101, 103 and 105 supra.
128 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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Court was forced to spin a web requiring future NLRB in-
volvement. Syres further eliminated the need for state action to
be involved before the fourteenth amendment could be invoked.
Since that decision, some legal containment of private discrimina-
tion has become possible under federal law. Not only was Syres
important because of the duty imposed to bargain fairly for
minorities, but the way was opened to consider other weaponry,
i.e., the unfair labor practice charges in section 8 of the Taft-
Hartley Act.
In Ross v. Ebert,129 two Negroes were refused admission to a
union and they complained to the Wisconsin Industrial Com-
mission. The Commission supported the complainants, but their
order was ignored because the decision was not enforceable;
further, the court could not find state action violating the four-
teenth amendment. Accepting doctrine laid down in Steele, the
court agreed that a union must fairly represent all employees, but
it further held that no union could be required to admit Negroes.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court would only say, "We do not
attempt to say what effect the union's racial discrimination . . .
might have in the union's enjoyment of rights to state assistance
in maintaining statutory benefits given labor organizations. .... 30
The dissenters in Ross felt:
It may also follow that when a state court denies relief to
persons excluded from the equal protection of the law by a
labor union, such denial is itself a violation of the fourteenth
amendment .... 131
Some of the rationale in the majority decision in Ross is
questionable when the extent of union control is properly
evaluated. A union which does not admit Negroes to membership
cannot fairly negotiate and administer a collective bargaining
agreement if for no other reason than that a group is prevented
from participating in union affairs. By endorsing the exclusion of
Negroes, white supremacy and control is perpetuated. Further-
more, the Wisconsin court failed to take judicial cognizance of
conditions existing in the construction industry which has been
known to almost completely exclude the Negro from skilled trades.
129 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957).
130 Id. at ,82 N.W.2d at 320.
1l1d. at , 82 N.W.2d at 322.
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By ignoring a definite market-place pattern and maintaining a
hands-off policy, the court gave its support to discrimination;
this approach can hardly be labeled neutrality unless a do-nothing
attitude is considered the equivalent of neutrality.
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the NLRB faced racial problems
created by appeals during representation elections. An unrealistic
approach was taken by the NLRB when it considered the segrega-
tion of locals and the exclusion of Negroes from unions in-
sufficient reason on its face to bar the right of representation.1 32
The NLRB seemed to feel that the segregation and exclusion of
Negroes from unions did not necessarily lead to unfair representa-
tion. Exclusion and segregation on the basis of color establishes a
policy wherein equality can never be realized, not only in schools,
but in every segment of social and economic life. Further, the
NLRB must have been aware that fair representation is most un-
likely where segregation and exclusion is practiced. Although the
Supreme Court in Syres demanded fair representation, the NLRB
was unwilling to adopt a per se rule holding exclusion and segrega-
tion illegal. Instead, the Board demanded proof in each case that
the representation was unfair.
Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act protects "the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice.
... " How can a Negro, segregated or excluded, "join or assist?"
If an employer hires through a hiring hall operated by a union
which segregates or excludes Negroes, how can there be fair em-
ployment? If a union authorizes segregation, employment dis-
crimination will necessarily follow in order to protect the white
members' jobs. It seems strange, indeed, that judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies only reluctantly acknowledge that union segrega-
tion is discrimination. A union barring or segregating the Negro
cannot be expected to police the hiring and promotion policies of
an employer who also discriminates, and a contractually estab-
lished grievance and arbitration procedure will not be used to
insure equality. In addition, the NLRB, knowing that Negroes
13 2 See, e.g., Sticidess Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2202 (1954); Pacific Maritme
Ass'n, 110 N.L.R.B. 1647 (1954); Andrews Industries, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 946
(1953); Veneer Products, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 492 (1949); Larus & Bro. Co., 62
N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945); Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1945).
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are unwilling to complain, tolerates racial discrimination. With
discrimination being the rule rather than the exception in many
industries and unions, it is amazing how few charges are brought
before the NLRB or state FEPC's against unions or employers.
The Board, while condemning discrimination in Pacific Mari-
time Ass'n., 133 said that Congress had not granted "express author-
ity [to the Board] to pass on eligibility requirements for member-
ship in a union."' 34 Rather than refuse the union bid for certifica-
tion in spite of evidence of discrimination belying the possibility of
fair representation, the Board certified it, feeling that policing the
union after certification would protect the Negro. Later, the Board
was forced to review the case in the light of twenty-five affidavits
submitted to it alleging discrimination. Again the Board ruled
that revocation of the certification would be considered at a later
date.135
Unfortunately, the Board, while disapproving of discrimina-
tion and unfair representation, tolerates it by certifying unions.
The Board could refuse to certify a union 8 6 and a court could
not review the decision unless an unfair labor practice charge was
properly brought. 37 Furthermore, the NLRB, prior to its decision
in Hughes Tool Co.138 in 1964, seldom used its power to decertify
a union engaging in discrimination. 39 As a minimal standard of
protection, the NLRB should insist that unions, notoriously
practicing discrimination, submit satisfactory proof of fair repre-
sentation before awarding certification. The NLRB approach to
fair representation has also been unfortunate in that national
union leaders, actively attacking discrimination, have done so with-
out the public support and leverage necessary to challenge local
leaders. If these national union leaders could use the threat of
133 110 N.L.R.B. 1647 (1954).
134 Id. at 1648.
13 Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 112 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1955).
136 Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 707 (1945). For
the view that the NLRB cannot refuse certification, see R. MARsHALL, THE
NEGRO AND ORGANZED LABOR 264 (1965).
'7 AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).13 8In Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953), the Board informed a
certified union that it might be decertified if Negro mem ers of a separate local
were required to pay an extra fee to process a grievance not required of white
members. However, in Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964), the Board
took a stronger position and unanimously agreed that a union engaging in
discriminatory practices can be decertified.
139 B. MAsHxm, Tim NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 263 (1965).
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decertification or refusal to certify by the Board, they could per-
haps more readily convince local leaders to follow a non-discrimi-
natory policy.
Free speech as protected by section 8 (c) of the Taft-Hardey
Act must also be considered during an election for union repre-
sentation. An appeal to racism in an atmosphere charged with
emotion can sway an election, and speech by both employers and
unions must be considered under section 8 (c). While the Wagner
Act controlled, Congress was primarily concerned with union
growth, and the expression of employer hostility toward unions
was restricted.1 40 The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, equalizing em-
ployer and union responsibility, enlarged the employer's freedom
of speech in section 8 (c) while protecting union expressions of
view. Technically speaking, freedom of speech was the congres-
sional leitmotif except where there was an economic threat or
promise of economic benefit.
Expressions of racial hostility .are resorted to by employers
anxious to curb union organization, while unions follow the same
technique to induce white or Negro employees to maintain a
closely knit and protective organization. Employers, ostensibly
following a fair employment guideline, have been known to ex-
ploit racial prejudice to defeat unions. 141 Where state or federal
FEP legislation controls, the task of the commission is easier than
that of the NLRB since, if employer or union speech has racial
overtones, this is sufficient evidence of discrimination which is
prohibited by FEP laws. The NLRB faces a more difficult problem
since it has no express mandate from Congress to attack racial
problems. A question not yet faced under FEP legislation is
whether an employer who appeals to racial prejudice to defeat a
union can also be held responsible by the NLRB without proof
of discrimination against an individual.
The NLRB generally takes the position that a racial appeal
prior to an election is protected free speech under section 8 (c) if
140 NLRB v. Whittenberg, 165 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Reeves
Rubber Co., 153 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1946); Rapid Roller Co., v. NLRB, 126
F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942); Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 101 F.2d 1023 (6th Ci:. 1939); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. NLRB,
94 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir. 1938); Ozen Lumber Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1942);
American Cyanamid Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 578 (1941).141 Sachs, The Racial Issue as an Antiunion Tool and the National Labor
Relations Board, 14 LAB. L. J. 849 (1963).
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it is truthful and temporate in nature. 142 It should be noted that
neither truth nor temperance are of particular importance under
FEP legislation if racial discrimination results. 143
142 n Archer Laundy Co., 150 N L.R.B. 1427 (1965), the employer
objected to the election of a union representative because literature was dis-
tributed, much of it to Negroes, emphasizing the union quest for equality. The
Board said that "a distinction must be drawn between racial propaganda de-
signed to inflame hatred . .,. and racial propaganda designed to encourage racial
pride and concerted action." Id. at 1432. The .nion appeal in this case was to
racial pride and thus protected by section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act. How-
ever, a court of appeals in NLRB v. Schapiro & 'Whitehouse, Inc., 356 F.2d 675(4th Cir. 1966), found union literature calling for Negro unity in a Maryland
community inflamatory and prejudicial. Further, in N.L.R.B. v. Staub Cleaners,
Inc., 357 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966), the court upset an election because a rumor was
circulated that Negro employees would be discharged unless the union was
chosen as bargaining representative. According to the court, even though the union
was not linked to the source of the rumor, the effect was coercive.143 The following are a few examples of instances where the Board has re-
fused to set aside an election despite the fact that the meployer had circulated
a letter to employees stating that: Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B.
750 (1958) and Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962) (the union
favored integration); Westinghouse Elec. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 364 (1957) (pro-
motion, if union were elected, would be based on seniority regardless of color);
Mead-Atlanta Paper Co., 120 N.L.R.B 832 (1958) (union approval would mean
more jobs for white employees); Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1520 (1964) (white
employees would be forced to associate with Negroes if the union succeeded).
However, where the Board is satisfied that union bias has been shown, they
will not accept the results of an election. Examples of situations in which the
Board has found bias are: Chock Full 0 Nuts, 120 N.L.R.B. 1296 (1958) (Negro
vice-president of the firm informed Negro employees that "he was the reason for
the union") Id. at 1298; Petroleum Carrier Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 101 (1960)
(employer threatened to limit the work week); Boyce Mach. Corp., 141
N.L.R.B. 756 (1963); NLRB v. Empire Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1958),
aff'd, 260 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1958) (employer threatened to jeopardize tenure on
the job); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 117 (1957) (employer
exhibited photographs of Negroes working with white employees).
The position of the NLRB was summed up in Sewell Mfg. Co.:
Some appeal to prejudice . . . is an inevitable part of electoral
campaigning, whether in the political or labor field. Standards must be
high, but they cannot be so high that for practical purposes elections
could not effectively be conducted.
o @ * 0
'Exaggerations, inaccuracies .. . whila not condoned, may be excused as
legitimate propaganda, provided they are not so misleading as to prevent
the exercise of a free choice .... The ultimate consideration is whether
the challenged propaganda has lowered the standards of campaigning
to the poinl where it may be said that the uninhibited desires of the
employees cannot be determined in an election.' Gummed Prod. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1092, 1093 (1955).
o * * 0
We take it as datum that prejudice based on color is a powerful
emotional force. We think it also indisputable that a deliberate appeal to
such prejudice is not intended or calculated to encourage the reasoning
faculty.
o 0 0 a
We would be less than realistic if we did nc recognize that such
(Continued on next page)
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The unfair labor practices spelled out in section 8 of the Taft-
Hartley Act are even more difficult for the NLRB to apply to
racial discrimination than the representation provisions. Section 7
protects the individual and group which must decide whether to
join a union. Sections 8 (a) (1)144 and 8 (b) (1)145 prohibit em-
ployer and union coercion used to protect group and individual
rights spelled out in section 7. Section 8 (a) (3)146 forbids employer
discrimination against union members, while section 8 (b) (2) is
an attempt to prevent union pressure on employers to punish
recalcitrant employees.14' Neither section 8 (a) (1) nor section
8 (b) (1) prohibits internal plant and union rule, including acts
of employer hostility toward the Negro or his exclusion from
union membership. Sections 8 (a) (5)148 and 8 (b) (3)149 require
bargaining in good faith.
In Miranda Fuel,150 the NLRB opened the door to the use of
unfair labor practices sections to contain discrimination when it
held that an infringement of section 7, which raised a question of
representation, could also constitute a violation of sections 8 (a)
(1) and 8 (b) (1) (A). The NLRB in Miranda was not faced -with
racial discrimination, but the intervening National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People [hereinafter referred to as
the NAACP] and the American Civil Liberties Union [herein-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
statements, even when moderate and truthful, do in fact cater to racial
prejudice. Yez ...they must be tolerated because they are true and
because they pertain to a subject concerning which employees are
entitled to have knowledge-the union's position on racial matters.
0 0 0 *
So long, therefore, as a party limits itself to truthfully setting forth
another party's position on matters of racial interest and does not deli-
berately seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant,
inflammatory appeals, we shall not set aside an election on this ground.
However, the burden will be on the party maling use of a racial
message to establish that it was truthful and germane, and where there
is doubt as to whether the total conduct of such party is within the
described bounds, the doubt will be resolved against him.
* 0 * a
138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70-72 (1962). See also Universal M."g. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 132(1966).
14429 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1947).
14529 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1947).
14629 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1947).
14729 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1947).
14829 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1947).
14929 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1947).150 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
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after referred to as the ACLU] were vitally interested in the out-
come. However, the court of appeals later refused to enforce the
NLRB decision, holding that the evidence was insufficient to
establish an unlawful intent to encourage or discourage union
membership. 151 Other Board decisions have held that an employer
unilaterally changing vacation benefits for Negro employees
only,162 discharging white employees seeking fair employment
hiring,5 3 appealing racially to white employees in Mississippi, 54
advertising for white assistance during a union campaign to
organize employees predominantly Negro,15 5 or threatening to re-
place white employees with Negroes if a union is elected, 156
violates section 8 (a) (1). If a union utilizes a quota system to
allocate jobs among Negro and white,15T or refuses to process a
Negro grievance,l 8 section 9 (b) (1) is violated.
The most controversial NLRB decision was Hughes Tool Co.
in 1964.1;9 The Metal Workers Union, certified by the NLRB,
chartered separate locals for Negro and white. In addition, the
collective bargaining agreement was based to some extent on color
distinctions. An employer, deciding to increase the number of
apprentices, turned down a bid by a Negro employee. The white
local, controlling the grievance and arbitration procedure, refused
to process his complaint. In a split decision, the Board followed
and expanded the doctrine enunciated in Miranda Fuel by finding
violations of sections 8 (b) (1), 8 (b) (2), and 8 (b) (3). The first
of these was violated because the certified union did not fairly
represent all employees as required by section 7. Because the union
forced the employer to discriminate against a Negro employee,
section 8 (b) (2) requiring that union membership be neither en-
'51 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1963).
152 NLRB v. Intracostal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1961).
There is also a violation if the employer grants economic benefits or threatens
economic retaliation. Robert Meyer Hotel Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 521 (1965).
153 NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965).
Remanded to NLRB for other reasons.
154 Durant Sportswear, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 906 (1964). But if the employer
is attempting to do away with past patterns of discrimination, there is no violation.
See Theo Harem Brewing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 397 (1965). Nor is there dis-
crimination if the racial appeal is mild and accurate. See Borg-Warner Corp., 148
N.L.R.B. 949 (1964); Happ Bros. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1950); American
Thread Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949).155 Associated Grocers of Port Arthur, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 468 (1961).
10o Certain-Teed Products Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 495 (1965).
157 Local 1367, Longshoremen, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964).
158 Local 12, Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
169 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
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couraged or discouraged was violated. The last was violated by
refusing to process the grievance, a function relating to the
statutory duty to bargain in good faith. It should be noted that
section 8 (b) (3) imposes a duty upon the union to bargain in good
faith with the employer and does not openly protect union
members.
All Board members in Hughes Tool Co. agreed that a union
practicing discrimination can be decertified and that section
8 (b) (1) was a proper remedy. The Board disagreed, however, on
whether separate locals for Negro and white constituted a per se
violation.10 The dissenters, although agreeing that section 8 (b) (1)
controlled, did not think that section 7 was properly considered
because Congress had not specified that the representation should
be fair. In addition, the minority felt that section 8 (b) (2) and (3)
were improperly applied because the white local was not given an
opportunity to refute the charges, and the unfair labor practices
sections were not aimed at securing fair representation for the
Negro.161
State FEPC's, Executive Order 11114, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964162 clearly indicate a policy prohibiting unfair repre-
sentation, union exclusion, and segregation of the Negro. To
maximize consistency of regulation, the NLRB should not ignore
policy expressed elsewhere. Since the EEOC was only given
authority to conciliate and since an effective remedy is unavailable
unless the complainant institutes a judicial proceeding or the At-
torney General requests federal district court intervention, the
NLRB must normally deal with segregation and Negro exclusion.
Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act permits ceding of jurisdiction
to a state FEPC by agreement, states enacting such legislation being
given a sixty day priority before federal intervention. But the
NLRB is not affected since the jurisdiction of federal agencies
other than the EEOC is protected. 168
In Smith v. Evening News,164 the Supreme Court approved
dual jurisdiction, for both the courts and the NLRB, but it was
160This case reversed prior Board decisions in Larus & Bro. Co., 62
N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945), and Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1954).
161 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1578 (1964).
162 For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see text foloving note
280, infra.
163 110 CoNG. Rxc. 7207, 7217 (1964).
164 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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approved only when a collective bargaining agreement covered
subject matter which was also an unfair labor practice. Thus, the
NLRB could take jurisdiction under section 8 while courts would
be entitled to adjudicate the dispute under section 301. This
duality of jurisdiction is very important since a racially discri-
minatory collective bargaining agreement can involve both a
suit under section 301 and an unfair labor practice charge, as in
Hughes Tool Co., although the 1964 Civil Rights Act will prob-
ably minimize this possibility.
In Whitfield v. Steelworkers Union,165 a contract was negotiated
allowing employees in a certain line, predominantly white, to take
a test for promotion, while those in another line, Negro employees,
were required to start at the bottom, often at a loss of pay, before
they were eligible to take the test for promotion. The union, never
certified by the NLRB as bargaining representative, was accused
by Negro members of negotiating an invalid agreement. The court
ruled that since Negroes participated fully and equally in union
affairs, the split in jobs between Negro and white was the result
of historical development and not due to current discrimination.
The appellate court was not convinced that the agreement was
unfair because white employees, at the time of the agreement,
were not tested but placed on probation for 260 hours.'66 The
court further distinguished the case from Steele and Syres,
supra,167 because evidence of an intent to discriminate was lacking.
The court of appeals, aware that an agreement cannot treat every
union member equally, held that hard and fast rules could not
be formulated and that problems must be solved with "com-
promise and accomodations."' 68 Neither the lower nor appellate
court in Whitfield considered the question of the jurisdiction of
the NLRB. The union, even if guilty of current discrimination,
had not been certified by the NLRB, as in Syres or Hughes Tool
Co., and decertification could not be ordered. But the possibility
that the NLRB could entertain an unfair labor practice charge
still remains.
In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,16 9 a union
6'0 Whitfield v. Local 2708, United Steelworkers, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
166 263 F.2d at 549-50.
107 See notes 101 and 125 supra, and accompanying text.
108 263 F.2d at 551.
109 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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indulged in primary picketing for organizational purposes. The
technical question faced by the Court was whether a state court
should have jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the Court, held that if the federal interest is peripheral or the
state interest is compelling, federal regulation is improper unless
Congress clearly indicates preemption. Questions of this type
arise frequently,170 particularly in circumstances where the racial
situation is explosive.' 7 ' For example where Negro demonstrators
contested the jurisdiction of the state court because of federal
preemption under the Taft-Hartley Act, the state court, citing
Garmon, held that state law controls where public safety is at
stake.172 States traditionally claim jurisdiction where there is a
breach of the public peace.
The Supreme Court decided in Charles Dowd Box Co., 73
Lucas Flower Co., 7 4 and Smith v. Evening News that either a
state or federal court could entertain a controversy concerning
an unfair labor practice charge and could apply federal law if
it is covered by a contract. If the subject matter of the controversy
is not mentioned in a collective agreement, the court, presumably,
is without jurisdiction and the NLRB is the exclusive regulatory
body.
In Syres v. Oil Workers Union, supra,175 a case decided by the
Supreme Court before Lincoln Mills, 76 the appellate court held
that state law controlled because the collective bargaining con-
tract was in need of reformation. 77 Anticipating its position in
170 See, e.q., In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); International Union, UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
'71 Jones v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 149 Cal. App. 319, 308 P.2d 393
(1957). Based on decisions made after Lincoln Mills, a state court could takejurisdiction over a firm engaging in interstate commerce where there is a
collective bargaining agreement but federal law, not state law, would control.
172For similar views, see Ford v. Boeger, 236 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo.,
1964); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of CORE, 210 F. Supp.
418 (D.D.C. 1962).
'73 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
'74Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1062).
17 5 See note 125 supra.
176 Textile Woreksr Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In this
case, the Court, departing from the common law rule, held that section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act indicated a congressional intent to enforce agreements to
arbitrate. Furthermore, the courts could, on a ad hoc basis, establish procedures
to determine the circumstances under which agreements to arbitrate would be
enforced.
177 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
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Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal
law, not state law, controlled collective bargaining agreements.
These cases illustrate the difficult jurisdictional questions of state
or federal regulation touching upon racial discrimination.
VI. THE EXECUTIVE RoLE
Maintaining a position of neutrality, the President of the
United States could at one time politically afford a "hands-off"
policy toward the Negro, thereby ignoring private discrimination.
While the politically impotent Negro was confined to the agri-
cultural South, the dominant white farm vote allowed the Presi-
dent to remain aloof.178 Prejudice or lack of interest could be
hidden behind the guise of neutrality.
Twentieth century developments, particularly the 1930 De-
pression and World War II, forced executive leadership, some-
times reluctantly, to combat discrimination. Changes were caused
by many elements: economic catastrophe, Keynesian federal in-
volvement, World War II and constant military preparedness,
recurring demands for fair play in employment from militant
minority organizations, and an enlarged conception of the role of
federal power.179 The 1930 Depression resulted in a shift from
economic neutrality, called laissez faire by economists, to govern-
ment involvement in order to create jobs, spur investment, in-
crease purchasing power, etc. Today, public policy is oriented to-
ward maintaining full employment, and tools used by economists
to implement this policy require executive leadership. The Negro
and others facing employment discrimination become part of the
overall program aimed at maintaining full employment for all
citizens.
World War II was a turning point since during this period
discrimination was the subject of considerable notoriety. Al-
though the United States could under no circumstances be com-
pared with the Third Reich of Nazi Germany or the caste system
178 Urban areas, under-represented in the House of Representatives and in
state legislatures, were considered harbingers of evil, while rural areas were
looked to as the well-spring of the "good life".
.79 NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 801 U.S. 1 (1937), which
opened the door to federal regulation of employer-employee relations under the
Interstate Commerce Clause, was another factor leading to greater government
involvement.
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of India, much remained to be done to assure equality for citizens.
Executive leadership was particularly essential so long as Con-
gress was unwilling to meet its responsibility. The urbanization of
the Negro and the decline in importance, nationally, of the farm
vote,180 further signaled the initiation of executive programming
to help an important voting bloc. In addition, so as not to be out-
stripped by a Supreme Court dedicated to equality, the President
could not afford to remain neutral; commitment was essential to
save "political face."
The Supreme Court is not politically vulnerable, but world
emphasis on the elimination of racism and new personnel led to
changes difficult to evaluate.1 81 Congressmen and presidents, hold-
ing elective offices, are more susceptible to public pressures than
are members of the Supreme Court. Yet for members of Congress
representing an area where racism is a way of life, race hostility
may assure retention of public office. Under such circumstances,
Congress responds slowly to the needs of the Negro. The Presi-
dent, dependent upon the electorate in each state to hold office, is
even more responsive to the needs of the Negro, but probably
less fearful of voter repercussion than are some Congressmen.
In wartime, the authority of the President is increased and he
is given much more discretion in dealing with emotional subject
matter. Negro pressure forced President Roosevelt to take a
stand, but he still held office for three terms before acting.12 In
1941, under pressure of a threatened march on Washington,
President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 which forbad
employers holding government contracts to discriminate18a A
five-member Committee was createdM and authorized to investi-
gate complaints, but it had no enforcement power. Officially titled
the Fair Employment Practice Committee, it undertook a number
18 0 See Baker v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186 (1962).
181 Frexample, one doubts whether President Wilson would have been
permitted, at the time of World War H, to slight the Negro in the same fashion
as he did when he took over the executive office. See R. LoNGAmm, THE Pnzs_-
DENcY AND INVDuAL LIaimnms 20 (1961).
182That President Roosevelt could live with discrimination is shown by his
failure to halt the evacuation of American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the
West Coast during World War II. Although Mr. Roosevelt viewed the presidency
as a point from which to provide moral leadership, it must be remembered that
the public and Congress were less receptive to the needs of minorities than they
are today. H. GA nES, WnEN NEGRoEs MABcE 31-42 (1959).183 3 C.F.R. 957 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
184The commission was later increased to seven members.
[Vol. 56,
Tim NEGRO AND FAin EMPL0OX'ENT
of general investigations which disclosed widespread discrimina-
tion. 8 5 However, the success of the Committee was small in spite
of the evidence gathered proving discrimination.
From this point, executive orders issued by Roosevelt and
his successors have played an important part in preventing dis-
crimination. Roosevelt's Executive Order 9346 increased the
authority of the Committee by permitting the hearing and
adjudication of complaints against industries essential to the war
effort. 80 In contrast to its operation under the first executive
order, the Committee successfully processed a large number of
complaints although undertaking no general investigations. 8 7
President Truman issued Executive Order 9980 in 1948, pro-
hibiting discrimination in federal employment 88 and Executive
Order 10308 in 1951 creating an eleven member Committee on
Government Contract Compliance to eliminate discrimination in
private industry. 89 President Eisenhower in 1953 issued Execu-
tive Order 10479 which abolished the Truman Committee and
created the President's Committee on Government Contracts.'90
This Committee surveyed the hiring practices of several large
plants and heard complaints brought by individuals. 19' The
Eisenhower directive gave little power to the Committee which
could only notify the federal agency letting the contract that an
employer was discriminating. If the employer was to be econom-
ically penalized, the agency entering into the agreement had to
assume responsibility.
In 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925
creating the President's Committee on Equal Employment Op-
portunity.19 2 This Committee was given considerably more
authority than the Eisenhower Committee since complaints could
be initiated against contractors, and contractors could be required
to submit detailed employment reports; in addition discriminating
employers could be placed on a blacklist to prevent those com-
185 Maslow, FEPC-A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver, 13 U.
Cm. L. REv. 407, 409-10 (1946).
18683 C.F.R. 1280 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
187p. NORGREN et al., TowARD FAIR EmPLOYmNT 165-66 (1964).
1883 C.F.R. 720 (194-48 Comp.).
189 3 C.F.R. 837 (1944-53 Comp.).
1903 C.F.R. 961 (1949-53 Comp.).191 p. NoRamN, et al., supra note 187, at 165-67.
192 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63 Comp.).
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panies from being awarded future contracts. This authority was
supplemented by Executive Order 11114, which was directed at
construction trade unions deliberately keeping the Negro in un-
skilled jobs.193
In 1965, Executive Order 11246 abolished the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and the Secretary
of Labor was assigned the task of administering the contract
compliance program. 9 4 President Johnson also requested that the
Secretary of Labor recommend changes in the Civil Rights Acts
of 1957 and 1964195 and coordinate state and federal FEP pro-
grams.' 96 This indicates that executive measures taken to eliminate
discrimination will become less important in the future, parti-
cularly if the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is strengthened.
A constitutional question which may be raised in the future
involves the separation of authority between the President and
Congress. It was suggested, before the enactment of federal FEP
legislation, that the President was improperly using economic
power to attain fair employment without congressional or, for
that matter, popular approval' 97
Evaluating the effectiveness of executive action as a means
of reducing discrimination is a difficult task. Beginning with the
Committees created by President Roosevelt, employment doors
unquestionably opened. But whether the program has been as
'93 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-63 Comp.). The Order requires building contractors
who seek financial assistance, whether a loan, insurance, or guarantee through
the Federal Housing Authority or Veterans Administration, to hire on a non-
discriminatory basis. For a more detailed explanation, see T. KMEEL, GumE To
Fkm EMNLOYMENT PPRnccEs 19-21 (1964). By 1963 approximately 117 unions
representing 85 percent of the AFL-CIO membership had signed agreements not
to discriminate with the the President's Committee on Equal Employment Op-
portunity. Hearings on Civil Rights Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 931 (1963). [hereinafter cited
as 1963 Civil Rights Hearings].
1943 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.). See also 10 RAcE Ri. L. REPI. 1832
(1965). This Order requires that contractors notify unions representing employees
that discrimination is prohibited by government order. In addition, the federal
government stated in the same order that it will recognize only unions
representing federal employees which do not discriminate. 1968 BNA LIX 2301.
195 For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see text following note
276 infra.
19 6 Exec. Order No. 11,197, 3 C.F.R. 278 (1964-65 Comp.). See also 10
RAce REL. L. REP. 94 (1965).
1P0 pasley, The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts, 43
VA. L. REv. 837, 856-57 (1957). For the leading decision on the question of
executive authority without legislative approval, see Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113 (1940), a rather sweeping endorsement of the use of executive
power.
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successful as claimed or could be expected is difficult to evaluate
since undercover efforts by the Committees, called conciliation, is
not open to examination. Furthermore, what is ample progress to
one is sometimes insignificant to another. The Kennedy Com-
mittee reported that employers joining "Plans for Progress" hired
four to six times more Negroes than in the past.198 From 1961 to
1964, more than 3,000 complaints were received and, according
to the report, effective corrective action was completed in sixty-
six percent of these cases. 9 9 Even in Mississippi, a state in which
discrimination is difficult to curb, firms holding government con-
tracts hired Negroes at an accelerated rate.200 The General Services
Administration [hereinafter referred to as GSA] claims that of
186 complaints referred to it by the President's Committee, only
twenty-five were unresolved in 1963.201 Of approximately 450 firms
contracting with the GSA, it was reported that, "No formal hear-
ings have been held. All complaints have been satisfactorily
settled through informal discussions with company officials." 202
It seems that the bulk of the complaints were dismissed without
the necessity of corrective action. Furthermore, sixty-five firms
joining "Plans for Progress" employed 2,419,471 in 1968, with an
increase in jobs of 49,994. Nonwhite employees prior to this time
composed 4.1 percent of the total work force; yet 11,230, or 22.7
percent of the new jobs, went to nonwhites.203
In spite of some success, trickles of information sifting through
the federal network seem to point to a less efficient use of economic
leverage than could be expected. To date, not one government
contract has been terminated nor is there any evidence of a re-
fusal to let a contract because of discrimination. In one case
reaching the federal district court, the President's Committee had
delayed action on a complaint for two years.204 In addition Negroes
hold few of the white collar jobs, which are an important and
growing sector of employment. 205 Many locals, in spite of the
'
0 8T. KHEEL, GUIDE TO FAro EMPLOYIEMNT PRAcncEs 22 (1964).
199 Id. at 24-25.200 Glaser, Find Mississippi Plants Hiring, Promoting Negroes, Des Moines
Register, Sept. 26, 1965, § G, at 14.
201 1963 Civil Rights Hearings 1061.
202 Id. at 1063.
203 Id. at 1125.2O4 Daye v. Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, 234 F. Supp. 815 (D.D.C.
1964).
205 1963 Civil Rights Hearings 1130.
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efforts of national labor leaders, have not accepted a fair employ-
ment union policy.206 For example, in Mississippi, excluding
education and agriculture, only one Negro was employed by the
state in 1963. If states, obviously unwilling to permit equality,
openly practice discrimination, it seems apparent that employers
in such an area will not bow without resistance to federal inter-
vention.
VII. STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIcEs COMISSIONS
Prior to the passage of FEP legislation, a number of states
enacted civil or criminal statutes outlawing discrimination.20 7
Due to political considerations and ineffective prosecution, these
statutes were of little value in assuring job equality.2 6 However,
during World War II, the federal government discovered that the
executive committee was a more effective technique than direct
court intervention in combatting discrimination in employment.
The trend of judicial regulation was reversed in 1945 when New
York passed the Ives-Quinn Act209 establishing a permanent ad-
ministrative agency to foster fair employment. To date, thirty-
seven states have enacted FEP legislation.210
A review of state FEP legislation discloses a number of
standard objections. FEP legislation is considered undesirable by
some because it represents government interference, tampering
with the free forces of the market place, and an unjust burden on
the employer.n211 As to the desirability of government inter-
ference, Professor Friedman, University of Chicago economist,
has expressed this opinion:
206In 1963, only 300 Negro plumbers and electricians were reported em-
ployed throughout the United States. 1963 Civil Rights Hearings 1799. At the
same time in New York City, there were no Negro members in the Sheet Metal
Workers Union and onlv two licensed Negro plumbers. Id. at 2168-69.
207 M. BERrGE, EQuAmrrY iY STATUTE 109-12 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
BERGrR].
208 Dyson & Dyson, Commission Enforcement of State Laws Against Dis-
crimination: A Comparative Analysis of the Kansas Act, 14 U. KAN. L. REv. 29
(1965).
209 IVES QuiNN Aar, N.Y. Exncuiivx LAW §§ 290-99 (MeKinney 1954).2 14 The following states have enacted Fair Employment Practices legislation:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Ham pshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York. Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvama,
Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
211 Bmanma 180.
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First, the scope of government must be limited. Its major
function must be to protect our freedom both from the
enemies outside our gates and from our fellow citizens: to
preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to
foster competitive markets. Beyond this major function,
government may enable us at times to accomplish jointly
what we would find it more difficult or expensive to accom-
plish severally. However, any such use of government is
fraught with danger. We should not and cannot avoid using
government in this way. But there should be a clear and large
balance of advantages before we do. By relying primarily on
voluntary co-operation and private enterprise, in both eco-
nomic and other activities, we can assure that the private
sector is a check on the powers of the government sector and
an effective protection of freedom of speech, or religion, and
of thought.2'
Convinced that an employer should be unregulated, Professor
Friedman defends discrimination because customers may not wish
to deal with Negro employees. 213 This concern with freedom for
the entrepreneur fails to recognize the needs of those facing dis-
crimination. Certainly Professor Friedman concedes the im-
morality of discrimination. Moreover, the enactment of FEP
legislation enlarges an employer's ability to hire, rather than
limits it; he is only asked not to discriminate against any citizen.
21 4
Professor Friedman's analysis also suffers from a lack of an under-
standing of our legal institutions. He reasons that government
manipulation opens the door to increased interference in the
future, and while legislation aids the Negro today, anti-Negro
bills can follow.2 15 Such criticism fails to consider the fifth and
fourteenth amendments strong bulwarks against the passage of
any type of racially discriminatory legislation. It is perhaps un-
fortunate that our judicial and constitutional machinery can re-
spond to the needs of minorities only in this negative fashion, but
212 lM. FarmmA, C~Arrmmsm AND FREEDOM 2-3 (1960).
213 Id. at 111-12. For the legal arguments in favor of employer discrimina-
tion based upon freedom to contract, see Berger, The New York State Law
Against Discrimination: Operation and Administration, 35 CoRaN.t L. Q. 747(1950).
214 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 149
Colo. 259, 368 P.2d 970 (1962), reo'd, 372 U.S. 714 (1963).2 15 M. Fsa-srN, supra note 212, at 114. To support his position, Professor
Friedman cites legislation passed by the Hitler Regime as analogous to present
federal legislation. This is hardly an appropriate analogy since Hitler acted with-
out regardto legality and would have attained the same objectives even without
legislation.
19681
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at least this response provides basic assurance of non-discrimina-
tion.
Another author takes the position that discrimination has value
-those facing it are forced to improve.21, Based on this criticism,
FEP legislation evidently coddles the Negro. The rationale ad-
vanced fails to take into account Negroes who have developed
skills, thus "improving" themselves, but because of racial dis-
crimination have not experienced economic benefit commensurate
with their new capabilities. Self improvement in any degree will
not bring greater employment opportunity for the Negro so long
as discrimination is based solely on his color.
Some claim that FEP legislation is ineffective and, hence, un-
necessary.217 Such legislation has not resulted in startling changes,
but this is an inadequate reason for opposing it since some em-
ployment opportunities have been created by its passage. FEPC's
have short run educational value but have considerable positive
effects in the long run. New York is a good example of this; over
the years many jobs never before accessible have been made avail-
able to New York's Negroes. A recent report states that since the
passage of FEP legislation in New York "the number of Negroes
in managerial positions increased by 164 percent from 1950 to
1960. In Indiana, Illinois and Missouri, where no... commission
had enforcement authority, the equivalent figure is only 6 per-
cent .... "218
However, the state FEPC's have not provided a complete
answer to the problems of discrimination for a variety of reasons.
The effectiveness of FEP legislation has been somewhat curtailed
by the elimination of many unskilled and semi-skilled jobs due
to automation, and the increase in new jobs easily filled by
women. FEP enforcement is also hampered by the fact that many
state commissions are staffed by part-time members serving with-
2 16Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N. C. L. REv. 271-72
(1965). The author advances other arguments against FEP legislation based upon
freedom of contract.2 1 7 Fleming, Equal Job Opportunity-Slogan or Reality?, 26 PERsox. Au. DM.,
Mar-Apr., 1963, at 25. 1961 WAsH. STATE BoAmD AGAwST DISCRuMINATION
ANN. REP. 10. Other claims made have been that morality cannot be legislated;
in fact, intolerance and discrimination increase where FEP legislation is enacted.
See, e.g., Kovasky, A Review of State FEPC Laws, 9 LAB. L. J. 478-79 (1958);
For the view that backers of FEPC's are Communists and Leftists, see R. S1M,
FtOmnom To WoRx 107 (1953).
218 Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a
Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALEn L. J. 1172, 1181-82 (1965).
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out compensation. Constant surveillance and complete dedication
is necessary to reduce discrimination and part-time service is in-
adequate. Most administrative agencies are composed of full-time,
salaried members, and it is difficult to understand why, generally
speaking, state FEPC's were singled out to function on a part-time
basis. Furthermore, FEPC's are allotted limited budgets.2 19 Thus,
the question is raised whether state legislators are truly interested
in achieving fair employment or are only "gracefully" bowing to
political pressures. With the existence of overlapping federal
regulation, it can be anticipated that at some time in the future,
economy-minded legislators will point to this as a reason for
political pressure. With the existence of overlapping federal
regulator, can only engage in conciliation, and is less effective
than a satisfactorily funded state commission could be. Thus,
permitting inadequate state budgets seems shortsighted.
In Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,22° the constitutionality of the
New York FEPC was tested when a postal clerks' union claimed
that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed the right to dis-
criminatorily select members and the corresponding right to bar
Negroes. Relying on cases which had arisen under the Railway
Labor Act,221 the Supreme Court could not reconcile the de-
fendant's demand for selective membership with the realities that
existed-the exclusion of Negroes means the absence of a voice in
an organization affecting their livelihood. In fact, if Negroes are
excluded from membership in a union, not only are they without
internal voice, but their ability to obtain employment is severely
hampered.
219 New York allocates $2,000,000 to the FEPC while California, a state of
even greater population allots only $640,000 to its FEPC. See Couser, The Cali-fornia FEPC: Stepchild of the State Agencies, 18 STAN. L. REV. 196 (1965). It
should be noted that the appropriation for the FEPC in California is much larger
than is allocated by most states. In 1963, the Connecticut Commission spent
$103,000. [1962-63] DxcEsr OF CoNNEaTiccrr ADaNismAnoN REPS. 109. The
1964 budget in Kansas was $60,385. 1963 KANSAS COND4'N ON CrIvL BRiGHS,
REP. OF PROGRESS 3. The Illinois legislature initially allotted $100,000 to its
FEPC. When New Me.,rco enacted FEP legislation, the legislature failed to
appropriate funds. See Staff Study on Effect of State FEPC Laws, 31 L.R.R.M.
140 (1952). The legislature in Missouri allotted $88,333 per year from 1961 to
1963. 1963 MIssoURI COMN'N ON HUmAN RIGHTS, ANN. REP. 19. The budget in
New Jersey for 1964 was $184,463. 1964 NEw JERSEY COzNa'N ON Civm rIGHTS
REP. 10. Several years ago, the Ohio legislature appropriated $189,817. 1961
OHIO CIvil IGHTS CoiM'N ANN. REP. 28. In Iowa, less than $35,000 was
initially allocated for operation.
2203 26 U.S. 88 (1945).
2 2 1 See cases cited notes 101, 103 & 105 supra.
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The union had resorted to the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment as a reason for the law's 'unconstitution-
ality. They claimed that since government employees were ex-
cluded from the benefits and protection of all labor legislation,
the duties contained in such legislation could not be imposed
upon them. Thus, government employee unions could not be re-
quired to admit Negroes to membership. The Supreme Court
rather weakly replied: "A state does not deny equal protection
because it regulates the membership of (a union) ... but fails to
extend to organizations of government employees provisions re-
lating to collective bargaining."222 In his concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter more forcefully argued that the fourteenth
amendment cannot be used in a manner which discourages legisla-
tive efforts to end discrimination in employment because that
amendment was, in fact, designed to end discrimination. 22 3
As a last resort, the union claimed federal preemption since the
Constitution delegates complete control over the postal service to
the federal government.224 The Supreme Court found no state
interference with the post office since it held that the New York
law was aimed at the union and not federal authority. According
to the Court, unless Congress clearly indicates an intention to
exercise its preemptive will, state regulation is permitted.2 5
Federalism was again considered by the Supreme Court in
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines,
Inc 226 The airline contended that Colorado FEP legislation was
unconstitutional because the federal government reserved the right
to regulate private industry operating in interstate commerce.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, held that a state
statute in tune with prevailing federal policy, i.e., the elimination
of employment discrimination, was not unconstitutional unless the
federal purpose was thwarted.227 If Congress, when Continental
was considered, had enacted FEP legislation, state regulation in
interstate commerce might have been unconstitutional because
= 326 U.S. at 95.
223 Id. at 98.
224 Id. at 95.225 For later cases where the Court adopts the same approach in labor
matters, see cases cited notes 169 and 170 supra. See also Delaney v. Conway,
39 Misc. 2d 499, 241 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1963).226 372 U.S. 714 (1963); See Kovarsky, Common Carriers and State FEPC,
8 ST. Louis L. REv. 175 (1963).
227 372 U.S. at 722-24.
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of preemption. Although the Taft-Hartley Act, Railway Labor
Act, and executive authority had been exercised to curtail dis-
crimination, this regulation was only peripheral and was not
implemented by Congress. The 1964 federal legislation passed
after Continental contains a saving clause, permitting temporarily
the state regulation of firms and unions operating in interstate
commerce.28
The Illinois Supreme Court considered the question of con-
stitutionality of its FEP legislation when an employer contended
that an appeal based on a final order was not possible because an
administrative decision could be modified at any time before a
final court order.22 The court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute because the purpose of permitting modification was to
allow reconsideration of a decision rather than to make impossible
a final administrative order, and there was no question of a modi-
fication in this case or unreasonable notice. This case also involved
a claim that the power given to hearing examiners to act in elimi-
nating the effect of discrimination was unconstitutional because
the Illinois Commission was not given the same authority. The
Illinois Supreme Court simply ruled that no decision of a hearing
examiner is final without a Commission, finding that evidence is
available to support the ruling. Presumably, the Commission has
the same authority as that delegated to the hearing examiner.
The FEP legislation in Minnesota, Alaska, New Mexico,
Maryland, Utah and Kansas seems to provide for a trial de novo.
In all other states enacting FEP legislation, the commission deci-
sion may be reviewed by a court.2 30 The EEOC, administering the
federal law, is only authorized to conciliate; therefore, any sub-
sequent judicial hearing is de novo. Laws providing for a trial
de novo are economically and technically unsound; not only is
there duplication of administrative and judicial effort, but parti-
cipants may refuse to cooperate with commission personnel until
the beginning of a judicial proceeding.
FEP legislation forbids employers, unions and employment
agencies to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, creed
or national origin. All FEP laws permit complaints to be filed by
22 s Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(f) (1964).
2 2 9 Motorola, Inc. v. FEPC, 34 Ill. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).230 See City of Highland Park v. FEPC, 364 Mich. 508, 111 N.W.2d 797
(1961); Lesniak v. FEPC, 364 Mich. 495, Ii N.W.2d 790 (1960).
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aggrieved individuals, and in a few states the commission can also
initiate complaints or investigations. It is evident that commis-
sions with power to investigate exercise it sparingly.231 A few
states permit private organizations, such as the NAACP, to initiate
a complaint. Federal FEP legislation permits complaints to be
filed by individuals, members of the EEOC, and private organiza-
tions.2 32 The majority state FEP laws do not authorize complaints
by commission members. However, where commissions are per-
mitted to initiate investigations, this power can be used in a
fashion similar to a commission-sponsored complaint.
Southern Negroes immigrating to urban centers in the North
are often either unaware of the protective FEP legislation or fear
an encounter with white-controlled justice.233 To maximize the
effectiveness of FEPC's, high-powered publicity is needed to win
the confidence of the Negro and to encourage him to take ad-
vantage of commission offers of assistance. Posting notices in plants
and union halls is inadequate, especially since conciliation must
be kept confidential. This lack of proper publicity can be illus-
trated. From 1945 to 1960, the New York Commission entertained
over three thousand complaints, some of them very significant, yet
only eighteen of these reached the public hearing stage.2m 4 Thus,
while eighteen decisions received some publicity, almost three
thousand complaints were merely compiled into a mass of imper-
sonal statistical data.
A fundamental difficulty in enforcing FEP legislation results
from the problems of proving discrimination in a particular case.
For example, the Connecticut Commission decided that an in-
surance company was not discriminating when it hired a white
rather than a Negro applicant for employment although the latter
was, apparently, a somewhat better prospect.235 When using such
231 Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 526-27 (1961).
23242 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (1964); A federal district court in Mississippi
recently decided that a union could properly bring suit under federal law when
an employer discriminated against Negroes in wage and job differentials. See
Chemical Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 63 L.R.R.M. 2213 (N.D. Miss.
1966).
233 Dyson & Dyson, supra note 208, at 34.
23 4 T. KHEEL, REPORT ON GOVENmEmNT PRocRAa AGAmsT DisCamNAT N
5 (1962).
235 Connecticut Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., (1951). For a more detailed
account of this Commission decision, see Kovarsky, A Review of State FEPC
Laws, 9 LAB. L. J. 485 (1958).
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a subjective evaluation, a firm will not be found guilty of dis-
criminating unless the Negro job-seeker is a substantially better
prospect. In Illinois, the Commission must follow more exacting
standards than in other states because technical rules of evidence
are used.236 To illustrate the evidentiary difficulty in Illinois, its
Commission found the Motorola Company guilty of discrimina-
tion, but the decision was later overruled because of insufficient
evidence. 237 In California the Superior Court has reversed Com-
mission decisions after three public hearings because the evidence
did not support the charges.238
If an employer hires only white employees when Negroes are
available or a union excludes Negro applicants, there is evidence of
discrimination.239 If Negroes are restricted to specific or un-
desirable jobs240 or if distinct job categories are established for
Negro and white,241 this is sufficient evidence of discrimination.24
Indeed, a failure to present an adequate reason for not hiring a
Negro may also indicate discrimination. However, the difference
236 Other states requiring legal rules of evidence are Kansas, Oklahoma and
Utah. In one case a Negro guard in a state pentitentiary claimed discrimination
when he was not promoted. Unable to find proof of discrimination because a
comparison between the complainant and those promoted in the past could not
be made, the Commission ruled in favor of the state. The Commission refused to
credit the testimony of other guards establishing the qualification of the com-
plainant because the guards could seek promotion at some future time; thus, their
testimony was self-serving. The commission did not review the past personnel
policies of the pentitentiary to show present conditions. Under Illinois law,
evidence of past violation cannot be used to establish a current infringement. See
In re Amzie Waters, Jr., 9 RAcE Rim. L. REP. 1522 (IM. Fair Employment
Practices Comm'n 1964).
237 Motorola, Inc. v. FEPC, 34 ll. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).238Couser, The California FEPC, Stepchild of the State Agencies, 18
STAN. L. REv. 187, 193 (1965).
239 Pittsburgh v. Local 27, Plumbers Union, 59 L.R.R.M. 2553 (Pa. County
Ct. 1965); Metas v. Building Serv. Employees, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 1208 (N.Y.
State Commission Against Discrimination 1961); Banks v. Capital Airlines, 5
RACE REL. L. REP. 263 (N.Y. State Commission Against Discrimination 1960);
Franklin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 869 (N.Y. State
Commission Against Discrimination 1957); In re Jeanpierre, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP.
685 (N.Y. State Commission Against Discrimination 1956); Shirk, Cases Are
People: An Interpretation of The Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Law,
62 DicK. L. RExv. 289 (1958).
240 See, e.g., Draper v. Clark Dairy, Inc., 27 L.R.R.M. 2072 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1950).241 See a statement issued by the New York Comm'n Against Discrimination,
1 RAce REL. L. REP. 1148 (1956); No-Bias Pledge by Maritime Unions, 28
L.R.R.M. 97 (1951); 7 PA. HumxAxx RELATIONS CoaraxiN ANN. REP. 12 (1962).
242 However, some exemptions are permitted under state laws requiring fair
employment. The hiring of Negroes and whites to conduct interviews among
people of their own color has been permitted. See 960 N.Y. STATE COMM'N
AGnasr DISCRIMINATION REx. OF PRoGREss 116-17. But the New York Commis-
sion has refused to grant an exemption to a firm seeking to hire a Negro to serve
Negro customers. See 1956 N.Y. STATE Coasshx'N AGAINsT DISCImINATION 45.
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in approach to the acceptability of evidence between commissions
required to follow legal rules of evidence and those who are not
so limited may be inconsequential. As indicated, few complaints
reach the stage of a public hearing, a factor well-known to com-
mission members. Since few complaints are subjected to public
scrutiny, commissions may ignore questions of evidence, at least
until the point of a public hearing.
Under state and federal law, private employment agencies are
prohibited to serve employers who discriminate. However, the
employment agency is the most difficult violator to catch in an act
of discrimination. The Illinois Interracial Commission reports
that prior to the passage of state FEP legislation, many employ-
ment agencies refused to list non-white job-seekers.2 3 The New
Jersey Commission contends that private employment agencies
serve discriminatory employers in spite of FEP legislation.244
Proof of violation is difficult to secure against employment
agencies which know the methods used by state commissions to
establish discrimination.
Jurisdictional questions have arisen. Foreign delegates have
complained that the United Nations restaurant operated by an
American firm did not employ a sufficient number of Negro
waitresses, and the employer voluntarily corrected the situation.
As a result, a complaint of reverse discrimination was made to the
Commission. The New York Commission decided that the state
legislation does not apply to employees working in the United
Nations Building.2 45 From a diplomatic viewpoint, the decision
is understandable. Yet, a New York employer was involved.
In another situation a charge brought against an airline by a
Negro was dismissed without a hearing.246 The complainant con-
tended that he was entitled to a hearing. Since the Commission
had not conducted a hearing, the court decided that it could not
review the case. From the perspective of the complainant, this
decision leaves much to be desired. If a decision is made by a
commission, judicial review is attainable, but without a decision
243 H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 1165, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., v. 5, at 3 (1949).
244 [1961-19631 N.J. Div. oN CrVI RIcHTs Bmmnj. REP. 10.
245 Ferguson v. Knott Hotels Corp., 9 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1016 (N.Y. State
Commission for Human Rights 1964).246 Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 3 App. Div. 514, 162 N.Y.S. 2d 506 (1957).
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the complainant is without judicial recourse. Somehow the
balance sheet fails to balance.
Due to the secrecy inherent in satisfactory conciliation of most
disputes, the effectiveness of FEPG's is difficult to evaluate. Some
weaknesses in state regulation have been already pinpointed-
inadequate budgets, insufficient publicity, and technical rules of
evidence hinder FEP enforcement more than other types of
legislation. Other problems, such as the employment agency which
caters to employers that discriminate, and commissions which are
unable to initiate complaints and follow through with large-scale
investigations, remain prevalent. Moreover, commissions generally
fail to recognize the urgency of the problem caused by dis-
crimination and lack insight into the Negro's immediate needs.
The quest for employment equality cannot be postponed, and
commissions are too often dedicated to providing long range
relief. Immediate and resourceful intervention is essential to end
discrimination in employment, but spirited promotion of FEPC's
is rare.247
If the Negro is to find his "place" in industry, he must be
trained to hold skilled jobs. 248 Reports point to the shortage of
skilled labor in the construction trades249 and an overall shortage
in the number of participants in formal training programs.2 50
Even in the industries where there is a shortage of skilled labor,
an irrational exclusion of the Negro continues. 251 State commis-
247 Our white population finds it easy to tell the Negro that he is pushing
too hard; but they do not face the daily antagonism. A review of recent Negro
literature by Baldwin, Wright, Le Roi Jones, and Ellison, plus the large city
disturbances, should make our citizens realize that the Negro is no longer
willing to wait patiently for improvement
248 Government, industry, and unions must meet the responsibility of training
the Negro since they forced him out of the labor market. Contrary to prevalent
opinion, the Negro is born with the same inherent skill and ability as any other
person. 9 COLO. ANT-DIsCRIMVNATION Coamf'N ANN. REP. 4, 10, 26 (1962-63).
The Negro in the South was at one time a skilled worker in the construction
industry. Yet, from 1920 to 1950, his number in the construction trades
dwindled. See Pollitt, Racial Discrimination in Employments Proposals for Cor-
rective Action, 13 BuFF. L. REv. 59, 60-61 (1963). As apprenticeship opportuni-
ties closed, the Negro in the construction industry became a generl laborer.
249 H.R. REP. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess 4 (1962).
2G0 See 3 U.S. Co~i'N ON CImI EiGHws, EMIPLOYMENT 1, 95 (1961).
251 Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity Before the Special Sub-
comm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 215 (1961); [19621 R.I. COMM'N AGAINST DISCRMINATION ANN.
REP. 12; Next NAACP Stop: New York, 65 BROADCASTING, July 29, 1963, at 91;
AGC Afulls Bias, Subcontracting, ENIRaMNE G NEws-REcoRD, Sept. 19, 1963, at
(Continued on next page)
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sions and federal authorities252 are now looking to the apprentice
system as a panacea for this inequity. Unfortunately, some unions
only reluctantly accept the Negro apprentice.2 53 With an overall
decline of twenty-five percent in registered apprentices from 1950
to 1960,254 and reports of severe shortages of skilled labor,255 the
public should be interested in minimizing discrimination.
Large firms tend to emphasize professional and technical train-
ing for employees and frequently encourage night coursework at
the college level. On the other hand, smaller firms are more
interested in training skilled craftsmen. 2- 6 This would indicate
that authorities responsible for the administration of training
programs face different problems depending on the size of the
firm. In 1962, the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training in the
Department of Labor estimated that 159,000 apprentices were in
training. Various state agencies have added approximately fifty-
five thousand to this estimate, giving a total of around 214,000 ap-
prentices.2 57 Ninety percent of the apprentices are concentrated
in three trades; sixty-five percent in construction, fifteen percent in
metal, and eight percent in printing.25 In finance, insurance, real
estate, and related fields employers generally undertake the re-
sponsibility for training workmen to assume duties requiring
additional knowledge. It is estimated that thirty-four percent of
the firms in these industries sponsor some type of training pro-
gram.259
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
43. Minority Worker Hiring and Referral in San Francisco, 81 MoN. LAB. BV.
1131, 1134 (1958); Negroes in Apprenticeship: New York State, 83 MON. L.
REv. 952 (1960).
25242 U.S.C. § 2513 (1961).
253 See Waters v. Paschen Contractors, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Ill.
1964); Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of Steelworkers, 223 F. Supp. 12
(N.D. Ill. 1963), vacated, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied. 380 U.S.
914 (1964). State Comm'n For Human Rights v. Fannell, 47 Misc. 2d 799, 263
N.Y.S.2d 250 (1965); Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 21 App. Div. 92 248 N.Y.S.2d
792 (1964); 15 N.Y. Ct. App. 2d 120, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584 (19655. Pittsburgh v.
Local 27, Plumbers Union, 59 L.R.R.M. 2553 (Pa. County Ct. 1965); Ross v.
Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957); 4 N.Y. CIvIL Ric;S BuREAu ANN.
REP. 3-4 (1963); Union Opens Its Doors, But Few Negroes Go Through, Des
Moines Register, Oct. 3, 1965, at 9-G, col. 1.
254 Groom, An Assessment of Apprenticeship, 87 MoN. LAB. REV. 391 (1964).
255 H.R. REP. No. 1370. 87th Cong., 2d Sess 4 (1962); 3 U.S. CoAmiN oN
CIvIL RIosrrs, supra note 250.
256 BUREAU OF APPRENTiCEsHIP & TRANINm, U.S. DEP'T oF LABOR, TRAINING
OF WORKERS IN AMERICAN INDUsTRY 10-11 (1964).
257 Groom, supra note 254, at 391-92.
258 Id. at 392.
259 BUREAU OF APPRENTIcEsmp & TRAIING, U.S. Dmp T or LAnon, supra
note 256, at 18.
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Based on the 1960 census, only 3.1 percent of the newly
registered apprentices were non-white.260 The Bureau of Ap-
prenticeship and Training reports the existence of 7,000 registered
training programs in 1964, but only since 1961 have these pro-
grams required non-discriminatory operation.2 61
As shown by the percentage breakdown of apprentices in
various fields, supra, most of them are in the construction in-
dustry where craft unions often continue to control in a dis-
criminatory manner. Where the hiring hall is in use, opening
doors for apprenticeable Negroes is difficult.26 2 Of ninety trades
currently classified as apprenticeable, there is a numerical con-
centration in twenty-one trades. In many of these skills, i.e., brick-
laying, carpentry, ironworking, painting, plastering, plumbing,
roofing, and others, the rate of retirement exceeds the number of
apprentices in each program. 263 By proper public planning and
programming, taking into account the long range demand for
labor, many Negroes could be profitably placed. One report
states:
Within the blue-collar categories, employment gains by 1975
are expected for all major occupations with the exception of
bakers, compositers, typesetters, and machine-tool operators.
Among skilled workers, job gains will be particularly large
for business-machine servicemen, cement and concrete finish-
ers, road-machinery operators, plumbers, pipefitters and tele-
vision and appliance servicemen.2 4
A pertinent factor often ignored is that Negroes (and others)
fail to complete their training because of low wages paid during
the initial stages of the program. 26 5
Applicants for training are sometimes tested as a means of
objectively selecting the best candidate. However, differences of
opinion abound regarding the validity of testing underprivileged
people. One author states:
260 Groom, supra note 254, at 294-95.
261T. KHiEEL, GUIDE TO FAm EMPLOYMENT PRACrICES 53-54 (1964).26 Tazewell & Lewis v. Local 2, IPEU, 9 RACE BEL. L. REP. 1561 (Baltimore,
Md., Community Relations Commission 1964).263 Christian, An Assessment of Apprenticeship, 87 MON. LAB. REv. 625-27(1964).2641 BNA 1966 LAB. REL. REP. 81 (Sept. 26, 1966).
265 Fair Employment Practices-California, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 512-15
(Fresno, Calif. Commission to Study Racial Discrimination in Employment, 1957).
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The Shucy-Garrett analysis indicates that Negro IQ's con-
sistently run 15 to 20 points below white IQ's; that the Negro
lag is greatest in tests of an abstract nature; that differences
between Negro and white youngsters increase with age, the
gap becoming largest at the high-school and college
levels .... 266
This difference in background, and not innate ability, shows up
in other types of tests. Thus, many feel that testing the Negro is
inherently discriminatory because questions are unavoidably
raised touching upon his culture. Another objection is that tests
are not completely reliable as a screening device and should be
used together with other personal techniques such as interviews
and letters of recommendation. Yet, employers who wish to dis-
criminate can use tests which are not developed for a discrimi-
natory purpose, but which, nevertheless, discriminate against those
with a substandard background.
Unions, setting standards for apprentice training, also turn to
examinations as a screening device and frequently determine ad-
missability exclusively on the basis of test results. This practice
is discriminatory if for no other reason than that tests are not
always an accurate barometer of performance. It is possible that
unions may rely on tests, well-knowing that the Negro experiences
difficulty in passing them. Employers often rely on interviews and
recommendations when a test score is close to borderline per-
formance, but unions tend to place exclusive reliance on the
examination. The use of testing as a means of selection should be
carefully scrutinized. Employers and unions with a desire to
circumvent state or federal FEP legislation may place greater
reliance on tests in the future, aware of the "built-in" discrimina-
tion.
Because of the publicity generated by the Motorola decision,267
section 703 (h) was added to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, approving
266 C. SmBEmuN, CRisis rN BLAcx Am Wrm 258 (1964).
267 Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois FEPC, 84 MI1. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).
This case involved a dispute concerning an employer's recording of a test score
made by a Negro applicaut for employment. The applicant contended that the
employer had falsely recorded his test score causing him to be eliminated from
consideration for a position. The Illinois FEPC upheld the applicant but the
Illinois Supreme Court held that mere suspicion or inference of discrimination was
not enough to prove a violation of the Fair Employment Practices Act. Since no
other proof of false recording by the employer was presented, the decision of the
Commission was reversed.
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the use of the professionally developed test.268 However, most
state laws neither mention the use of tests nor specify what is re-
quired to meet the standard of professionalism. Section 703 (h)
simply protects the employer relying "upon the results of any pro-
fessionally developed ability test . . . provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended
or used to discriminate." This provision validates tests which are
inherently discriminatory, even in cases where the employer uses
a test to purposely discriminate; proving motivation is very dif-
ficult.
Section 703 (h), strangely, refers only to employers; unions
and employment agencies are not mentioned. Even though un-
mentioned in the federal legislation, unions and employment
agencies should be treated in the same fashion as employers. When
Congress considered the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Section 703 (h)
was not deemed important and was included as. a political compro-
mise to assure passage of the entire bill.26 9 It was presumably in-
corporated into the legislation to satisfy the more critical members
of Congress who were somewhat skeptical about FEP legislation.
Section 703 (h) protects tests which are not designed to discrimi-
nate. However, this provision does not preclude a finding that an
employer who relies exclusively on a test discriminates; personnel
managers, weighing the merit of an employee, have never relied
exclusively on one employment technique to the exclusion of
others.270 Failure to request an interview or seek references,
particularly in borderline cases, may indicate an intent to dis-
criminate. If all applicants are tested and only white candidates
are interviewed after the test is successfully completed, discrimina-
tion is apparent. If an employer consistently tests white applicants
but not Negroes, there is evidence of discrimination271 Should an
employer, after enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, require an
aptitude test, this may also be sufficient to establish discrimina-
268 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).269 Amrine, The 1965 Congressional Inquiry Into Testing: A Commentary,
20 AM. PSYCHOL. 859, 860-61 (1965).
270 D. YODER, PERSONNEL PRRSCIPLES AND PoLIcIES 249, 266 (2d ed. 1959).2 71 Whitfield v. Local 2708, Steelworkers, 156 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Tex.
1957); Thompson v. Erie R.R. Co., 2 RAcE Enre. L. Bin. 237, 23740 (1957)
(N.J. Fair Employment Practices Commission 1956); Zeitz, Survey of Negro
Attitudes Toward Law, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 288, 291 (1965).2 72 Misuse of lob Aptitude Tests Questioned by EEOC, 1 BNA 1966 LAB.
REL. REP. 31 (Jan. 17, 1966).
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tion.272 Discrimination may be spotted when a professionally
developed test bears no relationship to the job.
Some collective bargaining contracts provide for the testing of
candidates. Although the 1964 Civil Rights Act endorses the use
of tests, the Taft-Hartley Act is silent. Conceivably, an employer
and union could be held responsible for bargaining in bad faith,
a practice forbidden by the Taft-Hartley Act, when agreeing to
use a test that would be acceptable under the Civil Rights Act.
This result is possible because the Civil Rights Act approves of
tests which may be inherently discriminatory in the absence of an
intent to discriminate whereas the Taft-Hartley Act presumably
allows the NLRB to exercise its own judgment in each case. Are
Negroes accorded equal representation when a union agrees to a
testing program? It is possible that the Civil Rights Act will be
considered together with the Taft-Hartley Act so that congres-
sional approval appearing in the former will also be added to the
latter legislation.
Because of limited backgrounds and a deep-rooted lack of
confidence in employers and unions, Negroes distrust and avoid
examinations and apprentice training.273 Regarding the apparent
widespread lack of Negro effort, it has been reported:
We find... what appear to be a quality of unreality per-
vading the responses [to questionnaires]. While few in the
sample have high skills, even fewer have made any effort to
remedy this situation. At the same time a majority are
optimistic about their future positions in the economy, and
feel most strongly that they will receive more and better
training, although there is no indication as to how this train-
ing will be received. On the other hand, a significant minority
are pessimistic about the future, and point to their lack of
training as their major handicap.....4
It is important to consider Negro history at this point so that this
"lack" of initiative can be understood. As reported by another
author:
A major part of 'the Negro problem' . . . lies in what these
three hundred fifty years have done to the Negro's person-
ality: the self-hatred, the sense of impotence and inferiority
2 73 Cooks v. Local 991, Ry. Carmen, 838 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1964), C07.
denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1984); See also C. SILBERMAN, supra note 266, at 243-44.2 7 4 Zeitz, Survey of Negro Attitudes Toward Law, 19 RTrraEns L. REv. 288,
292 (1965).
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that destroys aspiration and keeps the Negro locked in a
prison that we have all made....275
To assume full participation in training programs, the Negro
must be encouraged. The long run significance of Negroes
joining the skilled working class as soon as possible is that this will
enable succeeding generations to move into even more preferred
positions. In the short run, the public must anticipate and under-
stand the present lack of Negro appreciation for the few
opportunities made available.
VIII. THE CvmL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964
Numerous attempts have been made to pass a federal law
banning discrimination in employment. A bill was introduced in
the House of Representatives in 1942 to establish an administrative
agency like the NLRB to deal with discrimination. 276 Similar bills
were introduced in Congress in 1944277 and 1945,278 evidently
spurred by the militancy of Negro leaders and the unfavorable
experiences of the Negro during the war years. Investigations were
again undertaken in 1952279 and 1954280 to determine the need
for a federal fair employment law. But twenty-two years elapsed
between the date that Congress first entertained the thought of
enacting FEP legislation and the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. In spite of the mounting evidence of discrimination in
industry and unions, Congress was unwilling to play a leading
legislative role. Because Congress failed to act, side-door ap-
proaches, such as expanded use of the fourteenth amendment,
executive decrees, the Railway Labor Act, and the Taft-Hartley
Act, were used.
Discrimination in employment is essentially a national prob-
lem, particularly since some southern communities will not con-
sider the passage of state fair employment legislation.2 81 Even
275 C. SILMIeM~AN, supra note 266 at 11.
276 H.R. 7412, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
27H.R. 3986, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); S. 2048, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1944).
278 S. 459, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).279 Hearings-on-S. 1732 and S. 551 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Rights of
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
280 Hearings on S. 692 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Rights of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
281 Hearings on S. 1731 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 4, at 2652 (1963).
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President Kennedy, a liberal where racial equality was concerned,
felt that federal legislation might prove unnecessary if executive
power and limited judicial intervention could accomplish the
same goal.282 Even if he felt that Congress would not pass FEP
legislation due to the influence of southern and rural representa-
tives, President Kennedy's reliance on executive and judicial
power as regulators of discrimination was unrealistic in light of
their limited reach. Various pressures forced President Kennedy to
change his mind and submit an omnibus civil rights bill to
Congress. 282 The bill initially required only fair employment by
firms holding government contracts, but other legislative pro-
posals presented to Congress enlarged the scope of business and
union regulation in spite of heavy opposition in that body.2
As could be anticipated, objections to federal FEP legislation
were numerous. Some reasoned that equality is an evolutionary
process which cannot be rushed or legislated 285 (a position which
ignores the lack of progress and "evolution" for one hundred
years). Others, fearing the growth of federal power,2 86 claimed
that the regulation of discrimination is undesirable. Typically,
businessmen objected to all legislative proposals because of the
additional paperwork.28 7 Some presented the shopworn thesis of
freedom of association and said that because unions could not
select their members, FEP legislation would ultimately lead to
the loss of the unions' right of representation. 288 This position was
taken in spite of the fact that an overwhelming number of national
union leaders supported a federal law.
Others objected to that part of the legislation which would
authorize the Attorney General to deal with discrimination and,
in effect, turn him into a civil rights czar for the entire country.
It was also theorized that minorities needed job training rather
than anti-discrimination legislation which would allow private
industry to be regulated without justification. 28 9 Some also opposed
28 2 Action to Date by the 88th Congress, 43 CONG. DIGEsr 67, 75 (1964).
283 Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750 Before the Comm. on the judiciary, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-22 (1963).
284 Action to Date bu the 88th Congress, supra note 2982, at 67, 96.
288 Hearings, supra note 281 at 2743.
288 Id. at 2755.
287 Id. at 2788.
288 "FEPC" Features of the Civil Rights Bill, 48 CONG. DESzsT, 77-79
(1964).
289 Id. at 83.
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the legislation on the ground that it would hurt the Negro
economically.2 0 This concept was based on the notion that reverse
discrimination, i.e., discrimination against whites, is also out-
lawed, and many Negroes would lose jobs. It should be obvious
that elimination of discrimination will create many more jobs
for Negroes than will be lost.
The enforcement agency designated by the 1964 Civil Rights
Act is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a panel of
five full-time members.291 Enforcing the federal law is a full-time
job and exclusive devotion to the spirit of the legislation is es-
sential. There was some sentiment in favor of giving the NLRB
jurisdiction over all discriminatory practices, but the NLRB is
busy enough without this added burden. Furthermore, if the
NLRB were designated as the enforcement agency, some specializa-
tion by staff members might be necessary.
The EEOC has considerably less authority than most state
commissions. It can conciliate disputes, but cannot hold public
hearings or make binding decisions. State commissions can
ordinarily hold public hearings and make binding decisions if
conciliation fails. If the employer or union is unwilling to con-
ciliate, the EEOC may notify the aggrieved parties within thirty
days, and they can institute a civil suit in a federal district court,9 2
or the Attorney General, also notified by the EEOC, can pros-
ecute.293 Under state laws, commissions usually seek enforcement
of their decisions in a state court rather than beginning de novo.
However, under the federal law, a suit by the aggrieved party or
the Attorney General starts de novo.
Some members of Congress, critical of the NLRB and other
administrative agencies, feel more comfortable with a judicial
decision. Because judges adhere to exclusionary rules of evidence,
employers prefer the courtroom. The federal law is a weak effort
to make the best of two worlds-the use of administrative agencies
to conciliate problems and the authority of the courts to reach a
binding decision. This could damage the guest for equal employ-
ment; following legal rules of evidence makes it difficult to obtain
satisfactory proof. However, since few complaints reach the public
290 Id. at 89-93.
29142 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
292 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964).
29342 U.S.C. §§ 2000-6 (1964).
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hearing stage, at least under state experience, the authority of the
EEOC to conciliate without being able to make a binding decision
may not be too damaging to this quest.
One justification for the split of authority, administrative and
judicial, under the federal law, is the need, constitutionally, to
separate the role of investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury.294
This was an attack frequently leveled at the NLRB when it
operated under the Wagner Act.- 5 If given the power to incesti-
gate and make a binding decision, the EEOC assumes the func-
tions of prosecutor and judge. However, the state commissions
have not, apparently, unduly injured respondents because of the
multiple roles they assume.
A movement is underway to strengthen the Civil Rights Act
through authorizing a binding decision by the EEOC. There are
valid reasons to support the change. First, it is not economical to
require independent decisions by the EEOC and the federal dis-
trict courts as well. In addition section 706 (a) of the federal law
provides "nothing said or done during and as a part of such en-
deavors [conciliation] may be made public by the Commission
without the written consent of the parties, or used as evidence in
a subsequent proceeding."296 (Emphasis added). Thus, evidence
elicited during the conciliation effort cannot be used in court.
In a few states, commissions can initiate and investigate com-
plaints, 2O but the EEOC is authorized only "to make such tech-
nical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and
policies of this title and to make the results ... available to the
public."298 The federal authorization for such "technical studies"
differs from state laws which allow the initiation of a complaint
by a commission. However, section 706 (a) does permit commission
members to bring charges against employers and unions to assist
a Negro who fears community retaliation.29 It is somewhat
anomalous that while there may be no publicity injurious to a
wrongdoer, the results of a "technical study" may be made public.
294 Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 Hanv. L. REv. 526, 569 (1961).
295A General Counsel, independent of the NLBB was appointed under the
Taft-Hartley Act.
29642 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
207 For example, the California Commission can initiate an investigation.
29842 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1964).
29942 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964).
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It could be contended that individual publicity is forbidden even
though it is part of a study. From the vantage point of the Negro,
the entire prohibition of publicity is unfortunate since publicity
is a powerful weapon against bigotry.
Conciliatory efforts must be kept confidential in most state
proceedings until the public hearing stage. The requirement of
secrecy under the federal law is somewhat tempered by the fact
that the prohibition applies only to Commission members. In-
dividuals or organizations making complaints are not so restricted.
For example, the NAACP has publicized complaints. Although not
part of the statutory prohibition, the EEOC will not even disclose
the submission of a complaint. After investigation and conciliation,
section 706 (a) does not forbid EEOC publicity.
The EEOC has agreed to notify the Civil Rights Department
and the Construction Industry Joint Conference, both of the AFL-
CIO, of complaints brought against their affiliates.3°0 National
labor leaders sought government notification to exert pressure on
local officials who fail to follow the federal law. The NAACP
objected to the arrangement because the construction trade
unions, long notorious for discrimination, are given the first
opportunity to resolve a complaint.301 Yet, since the EEOC is only
authorized to conciliate, notifying the AFL-CIO affiliates can do
little damage if the dispute is resolved immediately.
Since secrecy is required during conciliation and the EEOC
is prohibited to later make available acquired evidence in the
courtroom, proof acceptable to the Commission will seldom be
subjected to outside perusal. Section 706 (a) provides that "if the
Commission shall determine, after such investigation, that the
charge is true," conciliation should be undertaken. If so inclined,
evidently the EEOC can accept minimal evidence to support a
complaint. Prosecution in a federal court begins ab initio and the
evidence accepted by the EEOC need not be revealed. On the
other hand, if the EEOC finds a complaint unfounded, the ag-
grieved person or a Commission member can petition a federal
court for relief. The Attorney General cannot intervene in this
type of situation unless evidence is submitted showing a pattern
of discrimination.
300 Criticism of EEOC for Notice-to-Unions Plan, 1 BNA 60 LAB. REL. REP.
263 (Dec. 20, 1965).
301 Id. at 264.
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As previously indicated, neither the Taft-Hartley Act nor the
Railway Labor Act outlaws the exclusion of Negroes from union
membership. The Civil Rights Act, in sections 703 (c) (1) and (2),
clearly states that unions guilty of segregation or exclusion commit
an automatic wrong. Because of the Civil Rights Act, the Taft-
Hartley Act and Railway Labor Act should now be interpreted as
prohibiting segregation and designating exclusion a per se
violation. This approach was taken in the Hughes Tool Co. case,
which did not arise under the Civil Rights Act.
The division of responsibility between arbitrators, the EEOC,
state commissions, NLRB, and executive authority is a maze with
which to contend. Section 706 (b), supported by section 708, pro-
tects the jurisdiction of state commissions by providing that they
are to be given the first opportunity to resolve complaints. Section
706 (b) provides that "no [federal] charge may be flied.., by the
person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after pro-
ceedings have been commenced under the State... law .... ." This
proviso, tne sixty day priority of state jurisdiction, is unrealistic
since few complaints can be satisfactorily resolved within this time.
The promise of future federal intervention may spur state activity
and thus reduce the time taken to resolve a dispute, but it is
doubtful whether the sixty day federal deadline can be met by
state commissions. For example, in the Motorolao 2 controversy,
the complaint was submitted to the Illinois Commission on July
29, 1963, a public hearing was held on January 27, 1964, and the
final decision announced on July 29, 1964. This represents a total
of seventeen months. Although the length of time elapsing in this
case may not be typical, it does point out that investigating,
conciliating, and holding a public hearing may often require more
than two months.
The benefit of permitting a sixty day delay for state prior-
ity of jurisdiction is conjectural. Those favoring state priority of
jurisdiction are either interested in preserving states' rights, fear-
ful of additional federal controls, or desirous of taking advantage
of the experience of state commissions. Based on the current
federal law, state jurisdiction may be advisable because smaller
firms, those with twenty-five employees or less, are not covered by
federal statute. However, there are many reasons for preferring
302 Motorola, Inc. v. Ilinois FEPC, 84 IMI. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).
[Vol. 56,
TmE NEcRo AND F~m EMPLOYMENT
exclusive federal jurisdiction. As a rule, state commissions are
inadequately financed and staffed. Those states recently adopting
fair employment laws can hardly be said to have experienced com-
missions. In addition, the cost of operating separate state and
federal programs may be greater than that which would be spent
in a coordinated program.
Section 706 (c) requires that state commissions be notified and
allotted sixty days to settle the dispute after a member of the
EEOC lodges a complaint under federal law.30 3 When a complaint
is made by an aggrieved party, the EEOC notifies a state agency
only if a charge has already been made to a state commission.
304
When a complaint is not lodged with a state commission, the
EEOC can abdicate jurisdiction if a written agreement is entered
into "under which the federal Commission shall refrain from pro-
cessing a charge.., and under which no person may bring a civil
action .... ,305 When Congress considered a fair employment law
in 1952, a proposal was made to grant exclusive jurisdiction to
states enacting effective laws,306 a methodology which was not
favored in 1964. However, under section 706 (b), duplication of
effort between federal and state commissions can be avoided by
agreement.3 07
Differences of opinion arise as to whether the EEOC should
abdicate jurisdiction. For example, the Illinois budget is not large
and Commission members operate on a part-time basis. In that
state, the initial appointment of Commission members resulted in
a political fiasco. The Illinois law requires its Commission to
follow legal rules of evidence, a requirement which increases the
difficulty of proving a violation. These problems indicate that the
EEOC should exercise care before agreeing to give jurisdiction to
a state commission, particularly since the federal law prompted
the passage of a number of state laws.
The federal law permits an aggrieved person or member of the
30342 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1964). The EEOC has authority to extend the
time period.
30442 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1964).
3o5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1964).
306 New Approach in Proposed Antidiscrimination Law, 30 L.R.R.M. 101
101 (1952).307 The Illinois legislature recently approved a bill permitting the EEOC
to use the facilities of its State Commission and authorized the negotiation of an
agreement relieving the EEOC of jurisdiction. See Anti-Discrimination Statutes-
Illinois, 10 RAcE BEL. L. REP. 1806 (1965).
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EEOC to prefer a charge "within ninety days after the-alleged un-
lawful employment practice occurred," except that two hundred
and ten days are allowed "after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice"
that a state proceeding has ended. 08 In the absence of a state-
federal agreement, a party dissatisfied with the decision made by
a state commission can petition the EEOC for relief.
The federal law does not prohibit state adjudication when
federal and state coverage are inconsistent. For example, the
federal law protects an employer unwilling to correct past in-
justice, 0 9 while priority for the Negro has been emphasized under
state law.810 Theoretically, under the federal law an employer can
voluntarily grant preference to the Negro. Although preferential
treatment may be forbidden by federal law, special job training,
a form of preferential treatment, may still be required. 11 This type
of preference may result in charges of reverse discrimination.
If the state law is ineffectual or interpreted as thwarting the
federal purpose, the EEOC can still agree to allow exclusive state
jurisdiction. As a matter of policy, the EEOC should not re-
linquish jurisdiction where the federal purpose will be hindered.
In any event, the language in section 707 (a) seems broad enough
to permit the Attorney General to bring a civil suit in a federal
district court irrespective of an agreement with a state. 12 Be-
cause of the limited authority of the EEOC, which reduces the
effectiveness of the federal law, Congress, may not have con-
sidered it necessary to weigh the effectiveness of the state fair
employment laws and thus permitted dual jurisdiction.
Another jurisdiction conflict is the division of regulation
possible under the Taft-Hartley Act, Railway Labor Act, and the
Civil Rights Act. The limited concern in fair employment by the
Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts could result in implied pre-
emption by the EEOC. There is no savings clause, similar to that
applicable to state fair employment laws, which preserves the
80842 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964).
80943 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964).
810 State Comm'n For Human Rights v. Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 799, 263
N.Y.S.2d 250 (1950).
311 Marshall, Equal Employment Opportunities: Problems and Prospects, 16
LAB. L. J. 453, 465 (1965).
81242 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964).
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jurisdiction of the NLRB.31 3 The legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act is scantily reported and the courts will be forced to
make policy-type decisions to ascertain the proper spheres of ad-
ministrative influence.
A number of reasons can be advanced in favor of multiple
federal regulation. 1) Congress, aware that the NLRB and the
courts consider racial controversies, did not expressly bar dual
consideration in the Civil Rights Act. Thus, Congress intended
that the NLRB, the courts, and the EEOC act, where appropriate,
on racial matters. 2) Since unfair labor practice charges and
questions of certification and decertification sometimes involve
racial matters, the Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts' super-
vision could not be eliminated by the Civil Rights Act. 3) The
EEOC is not empowered to make a binding and enforceable
decision; thus the NLRB and courts are needed to implement the
attack on discrimination. 4) A significant number of collective
bargaining agreements, enforceable under section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act,31 4 contain clauses forbidding discrimination in em-
ployment. To hold that the EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction could
mean that a court could not enforce an agreement banning dis-
crimination in employment. To hold that the EEOC has exclusive
jurisdiction could mean that a court could not enforce an agree-
ment banning discrimination. 5) In Smith v. Evening News,315 the
Supreme Court said that while the NLRB could adjudicate an un-
fair labor practice, the courts could handle the same controversy
if the subject matter of the dispute was covered by a contract
enforceable under section 301. This decision indicates that the
Supreme Court accepts duality of jurisdiction, recognizing the
inevitable conflict between courts and administrative agencies. 6)
The President of the United States has struck at employment dis-
crimination through an executive order-firms holding govern-
ment contracts cannot discriminate. Nothing in the Civil Rights
Act indicates that an exclusive assignment of jurisdiction to the
EEOC and a concomitant denial of Taft-Hartley Act and Rail-
313 Kammbolz, Civil Rights Problems in Personnel and Labor Relations, 53
Mll. B. 1. 464 465-66 (1965); Sherman. Union Duty of Fair Representation and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 Mnix. L. REv. 771, 805 (1965).314 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
315 Smith v. Evening News Asso., 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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way Labor Act jurisdiction, while permitting presidential inter-
vention, would be odd indeed.
Legal curiosities will arise because of the overlapping of the
Taft-Hartley, Railway Labor, and Civil Rights Acts. If a racial
question reaches the NLRB, adjudication is not deferred pending
decision by a state commission. Under the Civil Rights Act, the
EEOC may have to defer to a state commission. The two agencies
administering the Railway Labor Act, in dealing with discrimina-
tion and questions of fair representation may go directly to court.
While a temporary prohibition of court action under the Railway
Labor Act to allow the EEOC to deal with discrimination may be
a more sound course of action in the long run, the difficulty with
definitely endorsing an "EEOC first" policy is that this federal
agency is limited to conciliation.
Another oddity is that charges brought under the Taft-
Hartley or Railway Labor Acts are not cloaked in secrecy whereas
state and federal commissions, at least until conciliation proves
unsuccessful, must operate secretively. To elict publicity un-
available under state and federal FEP legislation, Taft-Hartley and
Railway Labor Act intervention could be sought by an aggrieved
party. Organizations like the NAACP realize that publicity is
frequently of greater value than merely holding an employer
responsible in the individual case. However, this advantage of
prosecution under the Taft-Hartley or Railway Labor Acts is
minimized by the fact that organizations like the NAACP are
not barred from publicizing disputes brought to the EEOC.316
The statutes of limitation, which control state and federal
FEPC's, the Taft-Hartley Act, the Railway Labor Act, and con-
tract suits in court, differ. The NLRB invokes a six month statute
of limitations for unfair labor practice charges. 317 The Civil Rights
Act requires that a complaint be made by the aggrieved within
ninety days after the wrong is committed.318 Statutes affecting oral
and written contracts vary from state to state. Thus, prosecution
under the Civil Rights Act may be bypassed or encouraged be-
cause of the various time limitations.
316 See note 233 supra, and accompanying text.
817 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1935).
31842 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964).
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IX. ENTREPRENEURS, PROFESSIONALS AND MANAGERS
To complete the industrial portrait, data pertaining to the
Negro entrepreneur, professional, and managerial classes is es-
sential. The Negro has seldom been an entrepreneur; in fact, a
positive aspect of the Black Muslim movement is the encourage-
ment of Negro-owned industry.319 Citizens of the United States
are, essentially, employees of industry or government, with less
room in each succeeding generation for self-employment. Thus,
although recent years have witnessed more Negroes moving into
the professional categories, greater difficulty has been experienced
moving into the managerial ranks.
A few Negroes, generally those catering to their own race,
have succeeded in business. This is true particularly in areas
where the white entrepreneur is disinterested in the Negro
market. But when the white industrialist believes that the market
will prove profitable, few Negroes have been able to compete suc-
cessfully. This failure is primarily due to an insufficiency of
capital and a lack of business experience. White-controlled in-
surance companies were, traditionally, uninterested in the Negro
because, in the main, the Negroes were without funds and had a
life expectancy less than the white. Yet, as Negroes concentrated
in urban centers, white business operators became increasingly
aware of the Negro market potential.
A tour through Negro communities in large cities discloses a
lack of Negro businessmen. This lack of small business owner-
ship injures the Negro financially and results in the loss of a
potential training ground for the development of craft and
managerial skills. Furthermore, a source of part-time employment
for Negro children is not provided.3 20 Sociologists and educators
have commented on the lack of patriarchal guidance in the Negro
family, often dominated by the female, and the crucial need to
provide jobs for the young. Small white businessmen in Negro
districts are prone to hire relatives and friends, which leaves the
Negro resident without an immediate source of employment.
When immigration to the United States was commonplace,
319 L. Lom-x, WHEN THE Woim Is GivEN 79 (1963).
3209 ILL. Co l ,'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS BinNAL REP. 10 (1961).
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the newcomer typically looked to the day when he would become
self-employed.3 2 1 The immigrant slowly stockpiled capital and
business know-how and anxiously awaited his opportunity. Some
claim that the Negro does not follow this example, but spends his
money frivolusly and is, consequently, unable to take advantage of
opportunity. However, this lack of savings is not always attri-
butable to frivolity since the average real income of the Negro is
probably less than the white immigrant receives. Furthermore,
Negro success in business is made difficult because of the lack of
purchasing power in Negro neighborhoods and the notion, pro-
bably correct, that a Negro businessman would not succeed in a
white community. Not too long ago in Chicago, Negroes owned
more than one-half of their neighborhood businesses but accounted
for less than one-tenth of all buiness income within the com-
munity.3 22 Today, with the growth of big business even at the
community level, the neighborhood entrepreneur, white or Negro,
fights an uphill battle for survival.
To encourage Negro ownership, government financial aid must
be made available and opportunities for business experience
provided. It would be an error to encourage Negro industry
solely in Negro ghettos; in light of continued differentials in in-
come between Negro and white and attempts made to integrate
schools and neighborhoods, serving the white community must
be encouraged.
For the purpose of striking where the greatest immediate
benefit is promised, Negroes should be encouraged to enter the
managerial ranks. But the Negro today is ill-equipped to under-
take middle or top level management responsibilities due to lack
of education and opportunity to acquire experience. Also, the
greatest resistance to employment integration will be at the
management levels; white employees will find it easier to accept
the Negro as an equal rather than as a supervisor in low or middle
level management. It would seem that Negroes could be wel-
comed with greater ease at the top levels of management if the
proper background was laid.
A promising development is the emergence of a substantial pro-
fessional Negro class. The professional class today is composed of
321 N. GLAZER & D. MoYNmA, BEYOND Ti MELTMG POT 32-84 (1963).
322 S. DR1xE & H. CAYToN, BLAcK MEmOPoms 437-88 (1962).
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teachers, ministers, public accountants, engineers, lawyers, doctors,
etc. In 1940, 2.8 percent of the Negro population fell into the
professional category; by 1960, the percentage had risen to 4.7
percent.323 However, this statistic is misleading because eighty-
five percent of the Negro professionals are teachers and ministers
needed to operate segregated facilities. Other sub-categories have
not grown as rapidly. Until recently, Negroes entered white pro-
fessional schools only with the greatest of difficulty. This forced
many Negroes to attend schools where the training was often
inferior. Today, however, Negroes, who overwhelmingly express
a preference to enter the professions,324 are being more readily
accepted at respected institutions.
X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Current employment inequality is directly attributable to the
absence of effective political leadership and the lack of mass moral
persuasion since the end of the Civil War. Political leaders then
knew that the Negro could not make a satisfactory adjustment to
freedom without government assistance-the Civil War amend-
ments and the establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau illustrate
this fact. By following a so-called neutral line, sometimes referred
to as laissez faire, the federal government early assured, as posi-
tively as if a law had been enacted, that private (and public) dis-
crimination would be tolerated. Government "indifference" led to
the inhumanity which characterized the future relationship be-
tween the races. Time, a panacea too frequently prescribed for
economic ills by the traditionalists, did not heal the prejudice. To
compound the problem, the Supreme Court during this period
did not choose to follow an enlightened legal policy-their deci-
sions in Dred Scott, Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases illustrate the
prevailing judicial attitudes of the day. Courts adopting the so-
called neutral position, that law cannot be made in the courtroom,
contributed to the frustration of the Negro which continued un-
abated until the Forties.
World War II marked the beginning of permanent change for
the Negro. As a result of Negro pressure and executive interven-
823 D. THOMPSON, THE NEGRO ImERsmP CLAS 125-26 (1963).
324 G. EDWA-DS, Tim NwRO PnOFESSIONAL CLAss 22 (1959).
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tion, Negroes fared better and secured some of the wartime jobs,
jobs usually of the unskilled or semi-skilled variety. After World
War II, Negro progress was again impeded, this time by rapid
technological change. It was apparent that the Negro would not
step into skilled job categories without governmental support. To
some extent, the Supreme Court and executive branch of govern-
ment then responded to the needs of the Negro and a pattern of
government involvement emerged. The thesis that government
rules best that governs least crumbled-Negro militancy and
changing world conditions required immediate government in-
tervention.
An emergence of new respect for the Negro vote in urban
centers, the enactment of state FEP legislation, and additional
federal government involvement benefited the Negro. Admini-
strative agencies, such as the NLRB, responded to the tempo of
the time and began to attack discrimination. The federal role
culminated in the passage of the- Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
new law should prove helpful, particularly in the South, and
represents a step forward. But the federal law is weak in many
ways, and until more "teeth" is put into the 1964 legislation,
federal agencies must continue in their roles as innovators to as-
sure justice and progress.
The Negro has profited from governmental efforts in his be-
half and also from general economic growth. The Negro per capita
income during 1963 and 1964 rose more rapidly than did the
white. The median income of the Negro family has risen to fifty-
six percent of the white family.3 25 In the North and West, the
Negro family income has reached about seventy percent of the
white family level. But indications for the future show little pro-
gress, and, in fact, some loss in many of the urban centers though
Negro population in the large city will continue to increase. In
1960, Negroes represented fourteen percent of the population in
New York City, twenty-five percent in Chicago, and twenty-five
percent in Detroit. Even witout migration from the South, it is
predicted that Negro population in the North will continue to
increase. Fortunately, federal and state FEPC's can be used more
effectively where racial employment problems are localized. The
325 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuLL. No. 1511, TnE NEoROES ix THE UNnTED
STATEs-Tm R ECONOMIC A SocAL SITUATION 35 (1966).
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EEOC, authorized to investigate, can more effectively use this
power where Negroes are concentrated. With his purchasing
power estimated to exceed $25 billion a year,3 26 the urban Negro
can also use the economic boycott to strike back at unfair labor
practices.
Thus, it is evident that many factors have contributed to the
current Negro environment. The change from an agricultural
to an industrial society and the more recent shift in political power
from the rural to the urban center have favored the Negro.
Optimistically, his economic status should improve permanently
since the concentrated vote of the Negro in the urban complex
has become more effective, and thus more important to white
political leaders.
The Negro should be cognizant that "young persons are likely
to be less prejudiced than older persons; second, better educated
persons are likely to be less prejudiced than less well-educated
persons; and third, higher socio-economic status is likely to be as-
sociated with less prejudice than is lower status .... ,327 (Empha-
sis added). But let us not presume that the great bulk of prejudice
only comes from the less-favored white classes. The more educated
and financially influential people are better able to disguise pre-
judice and exert it with greater delicacy. Prejudice still exists at
all levels of American life.
Business and union leaders as well as governmental organiza-
tions must exhibit the same competence and responsibility in em-
ployee affairs as they exert in technical matters. If employers and
union leaders fully accept responsibility, employment inequality
and related injustices can be resolved. Without complete employer
and union cooperation, additional legal, executive, and congres-
sional involvement will be necessary to solve racial employment
difficulties.
3 213T. KHEEL, GUIDE TO FAiR EMPLOYMENT PRACTnCES 6 (1964). It is
assumed that the GNP for Negroes now exceeds the 20 to 25 billion dollar figure
advanced by Mr. Kheel.3 27 B. BETrEL-EML & M. JANowrrz, SociAL CiAN GE AND PREJUDIcE 15
(1964).
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